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PREFACE
This thesis consists of two separate essays. The first essay is titled "Impacts of
Exclusive Marketing/Procurement Agreements on Fed Cattle Transaction Prices: An
Experimental Simulation Approach". This first essay seeks to determine how exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements affect the level and variability of fed cattle
transaction prices. A simulated fed cattle market was used to evaluate fed cattle
transaction prices during periods where exclusive marketing/procurement agreements
were being utilized by the largest simulated meatpacking firm and two large simulated
feedlot firms. This essay also considers fed cattle transaction prices during periods
when no exclusive marketing/procurement agreements active. Furthermore, this essay
seeks to determine whether or not the level and variability of simulated transaction
prices were significantly different during periods when the subjects of experimental
simulation were being rewarded with economic incentives than during periods when
subjects were not being rewarded. Primary contributions of this essay, unlike previous
research, are evaluations of level and variability impacts on fed cattle transaction prices
observed by: the entire fed cattle market during agreement and non-agreement periods,
the participants of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements during agreement and
non-agreement periods, and the non-participants of exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements during agreement and non-agreement periods. The data analyzed in this
iii
essay were generated by students of the Agricultural Economics Course 3990 at
Oklahoma State University. The experimental design included two 16-week periods,
out of a total of 75 experimentally simulated trading weeks, where exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements where actively being utilized. The experimental
design also included 4-7 week periods when subjects were being rewarded. Reward
periods were randomly interspersed throughout the entire 75 weeks of simulated
trading.
The second essay, titled "Marketing Method Price Differences in the Fed Cattle
Market: An Experimental Simulation Approach", seeks to determine the significance of
fed cattle transaction price differences under three alternative marketing methods. The
alternative marketing methods considered in this essay are: cash transactions, cash
forward contracts, and exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. Level and
variability differences in simulated fed cattle transaction prices were evaluated among
each of these methods. The simulated transaction price data and experimental design
considered in this essay is the same as that which was considered by the first essay.
Hence, the data and experimental design for both essays is presented once in the tirst
essay and is excluded from duplication in this essay. The difference is that this essay
does not separate prices observed by the participants and non-participants of the
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. This allows the comparison of all
exclusive marketing/procurement agreement transactions to cash forward contracts and
cash transactions. The primary contribution of this essay is that, unlike previous
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research, it includes price variance differences between each marketing method as well
as mean and variance differences for each method utilized by individual firms.
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ESSAY ONE
IMPACTS OF EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
ON FED CATTLE TRANSACTION PRICES: AN EXPERIMENTAL
SIMULATION APPROACH
IMPACTS OF EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
ON FED CATTLE TRANSACTION PRICES: AN EXPERIMENTAL
SIMULATION APPROACH
Abstract
The recent increase in exclusive marketing/procurement agreements between
meatpacking and feedlot firms has created concern about how the level and variability
of fed cattle transaction prices are affected. Existing agreements involve written or
verbal contracts that allow the participating firms to market or purchase finished cattle
at formula based prices for which the details are not made public. Experimental
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements were applied to a simulated fed cattle
market. Two econometric models were developed from previous studies to evaluate
price level and variability differences between agreement and non-agreement periods.
Price level and variability differences between participating and non-participating firms
of the agreements during agreement and non-agreement periods were also evaluated.
The effects of economically rewarding the subjects of experimental simulation studies
on fed cattle transaction prices were evaluated. Results indicate that participants of
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements realized significantly lower price means
and variances than non-participating firms. However, the mean and variance of market
prices were found to be higher during the agreement periods than during the non-
agreement periods. Economic reward and non-reward periods were not found to have
significantly different price levels.
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IMPACTS OF EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
ON FED CATILE TRANSACTION PRICES: AN EXPERIMENTAL
SIMULATION APPROACH
Introduction
Problem
Price discovery is described as the process of buyers and sellers gathering and
interpreting information about the supply and demand of the product or products in
question, formulating bid and asking prices, negotiating those prices, and adjusting the
formulated bid and asking prices according to new market information as it becomes
available across time (Purcell 1991). This process is completed several times each day
in the fed cattle market as meatpacking and feedlot firms negotiate the sale or purchase
of finished cattle. Due to both horizontal and vertical integration, price discovery
issues within the fed cattle market have become a topic of focus over the last ten years.
These issues range from the degree of concentration among beefpacking firms to the
availability and value of market information. Due to the internalization of private
information, the primary and secondary data required for the analysis of these issues is
difficult to acquire.
Among price discovery issues is the question of how different types of captive
supplies impact fed cattle transaction prices. Over the last decade, meatpacking and
feedlot firms have increased in size and some have entered into exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements. These agreements involve a verbal or a written
contract between one meatpacking firm and one or more feedlot firms. Many of the
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agreements are structured so that they allow participating firms to engage in profit-
sharing pricing strategies. Existing agreements have also been structured so that
additional firms cannot be included and so that details of each agreement are not made
public. Industry concerns range from the actual impacts that these exclusive
agreements have on transaction prices, to their effects on the availability of market
information. However, collecting data from the relevant firms has become increasingly
difficult as a direct result of the consolidation and concentration of firms, and the
confidentiality and complexity of the marketing/procurement agreements that have
evolved within the industry. By simulating the fed cattle market in a way that buyers
and sellers behave in a manner parallel to today's fed cattle market, many data
collection problems are overcome. Furthermore, the impacts of exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements on specific characteristics of the fed cattle market
can be addressed through the application of experimental agreements to the simulated
market.
Research Significance
Research is needed that will focus on exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements between meatpacking and feedlot firms that exist in today's fed cattle
market. This research could provide the insight needed to assess how these exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements will affect price variability, the short-run supply of
fed cattle, and changes in the financial stability of the individual participating firms
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resulting from the agreement. By doing so, real world developments in the fed cattle
industry that were discussed above can be addressed.
Two research projects have estimated the impacts of different forms of captive
supplies on the fed cattle market (Schroeder et al.; Ward et a1. ]996a). The three most
commonly recognized forms of captive supplies are: (1) forward contracting, (2)
packer owned or packer fed cattle, and (3) marketing/procurement agreements. In
general, these studies evaluated the overall response of market prices to one or more of
the three forms of captive supplies using data collected from the industry. This study
differs from previous research in the sense that it uses a realistically simulated market
to produce data that allows focus on how prices behave during periods when
agreements are being utilized versus market periods when no agreements exist. This
study also evaluates how participant prices differ from non-participant prices during
both agreement and non-agreement periods. Therefore, this study will refute or
strengthen previous research considering marketing/procurement agreements and focus
on the specific details of exclusive marketing/procurement agreement impacts on the
fed cattle market.
The conclusions made from this study will be of interest to several groups of
people who are involved in livestock marketing, procurement, and food processing.
One commonly cited reason for the need of this type of study is centered around the
noted changes involved in all of the U. S. meat markets leading towards a value based
marketing system which has been and can be further facilitated by extensions of
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. This could be accomplished through
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meatpacking and feedlot firms by specifying premiums for selected meat quality within
the terms of the agreements.
Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this research is to answer industry questions about the short and
long-term effects of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on specific
characteristics of the fed cattle market. The first question is centered around impacts of
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on transaction price levels in the fed
cattle market and how prices respond to these agreements. Another is the variability of
transaction prices and whether or not price variances are increased or decreased by the
existence of marketing agreements. Another characteristic of interest within the fed
cattle market is firm and industry wide profits and their relationship to marketing
agreements. An additional purpose to this study is provide information about the
impacts of economically rewarding the subjects of simulated markets.
The general objective of this study is to determine how exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements between meatpacking and feedlot firms will affect
specific characteristics of the fed cattle market. Specific objectives are: (1) to
determine the effects of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on the level of
fed cattle transaction prices, (2) to determine the effects of exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements on the variability of fed cattle transaction price
levels, (3) to determine the effects of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on
6
weekly mean fed cattle transaction prices, (4) to determine how economically
rewarding or not rewarding participants of a simulated market affects the level of
transaction prices, (5) to determine how economically rewarding or not rewarding
participants of a simulated market affects the variability of transaction prices, and (6) to
determine how weekly mean fed cattle transaction prices are affected by economically
rewarding or not rewarding the subjects of the simulated market.
Scope and Limitations ofExperimental Simulation
Experimental simulation has been referred to as the integration of business
simulation and experimental economic methods (Ward et aI. 1996b). In this light
experimental simulation often entails the components of microeconomic systems that
have been identified by experimental economists for laboratory experiments (Smith
1982; Friedman and Sunder). Thus, within a specified market structure and a set
institutional structure, teams or firms and the subjects of experimental simulation
studies are allowed to make decisions that have a direct effect on the performance of
their particular firm and on the entire market.
The point of separation between experimental economics and experimental
simulation revolves around the amount of physical control the researcher has on the
subjects of the microeconomic system. In most experimental economics research
designs, the experimenter purposefully and directly controls specific variables of the
system. This allows the experimenter to monitor and focus on other specific variables
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in order to draw conclusions about how those variables react to different types of
economically oriented changes (Friedman and Sunder). On the other hand,
experimental simulation designs control very few of the variables within
microeconomic systems which allows the economic variables to naturally interact with
one another much like real-world markets (Ward et al. 1996b). In this setting,
participants of the simulated market are left to observe the consequences of the
interrelated and sometimes simultaneous decisions that they must make as they function
within their respective markets. Therefore, experimental simulation studies are
restricted to the decision making behavior of the participants in the simulated market
and in the experimental setting. Data produced by experimental simulation can be
analyzed using econometric models that explain the interrelationships of the economic
variables within the market in question. These studies must also use models that
capture the dynamic decision making behavior of market participants. The purpose of
experimental simulation is to evaluate dynamic relationships between many economic
variables of a specified market when major components of that market are affected by
realistic market changes (Ward et al. 1996b).
Relevant Theory in Previous Research
Previous research has been conducted to answer many questions about how
changing market conditions have affected the fed cattle market. Economic theory was
used in these studies to develop the methodology chosen to evaluate each question.
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These questions consider topics that range from the impacts of structural change to the
factors which explain fed cattle transaction prices. This study utilizes theoretical
developments from previous research to examine another fed cattle market occurrence
and fulfJll the stated objectives. Additionally, this study considers previous
experimental economics research which focuses on the design of economic experiments
and the impacts of rewarding experimental subjects. The specific research used as a
basis for this study is briefly discussed here.
The Fed Cattle Market
The degree of firm consolidation and concentration in the beef slaughtering
industry increased dramatically during the 1980s. Purcell (1990) noted that four-firm
concentration ratios in boxed beef production increased from 51 % in 1979 to 79% in
1988. Hayenga and O'Brien found that dramatic decreases in the number of beef
slaughtering plants and plant owners since 1980 in the southern plains states have
significant impacts on the prices paid for fed cattle. Schroeter evaluated the impacts of
recent increases in firm concentration in the U. S. beef packing industry and found that
significant monopoly/monopsony price distortions exist. This increase has fueled a
growing concern about the possibility of non-competitive market performance in
slaughter cattle and wholesale beef markets. The impacts of increased consolidation
and concentration on market prices have been examined since the early 1980s
(Schroeter 1988, 1990; Purcell 1990; Conner; Ward 1992; Hayenga and O'Brien).
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-These studies have examined techniques that use U.S. beef packing industry data to test
the competitiveness of the industry's input and output markets. The results of
concentration and consolidation research relative to the fed cattle market have suggested
that the decline in structural competitiveness of the beef packing industry has not
impacted the magnitude of the price distortions that previously existed (Schroeter
1988).
Other research in this area has evaluated the chain of events leading to the four
firm concentration existing in today's beef packing industry and has discussed the
market power evaluation techniques that were used during the early to late 1980's
(Connor; Purcell 1990; Schroeter 1990). Conclusions suggest that both the Bainsian
Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm (SCPP) and the New Empirical Industrial
Organization (NErO) approaches have produced rich detail about the structural changes
in the beef industry, but there are several areas of research that are yet to be satisfied
by both schools of thought (Schroeter 1990; Connor). Research has also been
conducted that examines the economics of consolidation and concentration in the
beefpacking industry and that reveals possible reasons for its occurrence as well as why
it was allowed to occur (Purcell 1990). Results generally suggest that increased
efficiency was achieved by the leading firms through acquisitions and mergers. These
studies commonly suggested that it was often cheaper to buy capacity rather than to
build it which helped create the industry giants that are known as IBP, Excel, and
ConAgra. Furthermore, consolidation and firm concentration research in the fed cattle
market has indicated that firms have economic incentives to operate larger plants with
10
multiple labor shifts and to keep the plants operating at or near capacity utilization
levels. Therefore, there is a range of plant sizes and annual volumes that achieve cost
economies for most of the plants operating in the beefpacking industry (purcell 1990;
Ward 1993).
During the 1980 to 1990 period of increasing concentration and consolidation,
fed cattle transaction prices were indirectly impacted by changing market
characteristics. Initially, transaction price models were developed in order to analyze
the short-term pricing process of the fed cattle market by estimating alternative models
that explained the variation in transaction prices for fed cattle (Ward 1981; Ward
1982). These models have also revealed the important variables that explain fed cattle
transaction prices such as wholesale carcass beef prices, wholesale boxed beef prices,
and live cattle futures market prices. These early studies often suggested that the
variation among transaction price equations for the short study periods created
difficulty in developing accurate short-period price forecasting equations.
Furthermore, results indicated that the economic variables considered were most often
unable to measure the psychological and sociological factors involved in the discovery
of transaction prices for fed cattle in short time periods. Early transaction price studies
also evaluated whether or not larger firms have the ability to pay lower prices
compared to the smaller firms in the beefpacking industry. Results were often mixed
due the non-availability of accurate fed cattle pricing information (Ward 1981; Ward
1982).
Related research followed in the early 1990's that examined the differences in
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fed cattle transaction prices among buyers and buyer groups following the mergers of
the meatpacking frrms in the late 1980's. Results produced by these studies often
indicated that significant relationships do exist between the transaction price and the
number of days between purchase and delivery, that there are significant price
differences among individual buyers and buyer groups, and that significantly lower
prices were being experienced by the largest firms within the fed cattle market.
Additional research conducted during this time period evaluated the differences between
the average prices paid by individual buyers and buyer groups within regions and
subregions (Ward 1992; Jones et al.; Schroeder et al.).
Experimental Economics
Experimental economic research has traditionally been focused on the use of
laboratory experiments to evaluate a wide variety of theoretical issues that range from
the testing of market hypotheses to the stability of equilibrium prices in specific types
of markets. Early experimental economics research revealed the value of laboratory
experiments. This research focused on the importance and significance of testing
different economic theories in experimental systems where 'Teal world" characteristics
arise naturally (Smith 1976). It was found in these early experiments that economically
rewarding subjects increased their individual performance based on several different
types of criterion (Smith 1982). Game boredom was often cited as the primary reason
for these results.
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Experimental economic studies also examined the structure of microeconomic
experiments and explained the various ingredients that make up experimental
microeconomic systems (Smith 1982; Plott 1982). The use of experimental
microeconomic systems was commonly offered as a plausible method of testing the
hypotheses embedded in economic theories. Accordingly, experimental economic
research used laboratory experiments as a valuable way of validating economic theories
(Smith 1976; Smith 1982). More recent experimental economic studies have been
conducted to reveal other types of explanations for economists performing laboratory
experiments (Forsythe et al.; Plott et al.). A common objective among many
experimental economists is to probe the sources of a theory's failure in order to
disclaim the theory or to make the adjustments needed for correction. These studies
suggest that many experimental economists take confounding problems with conflicting
hypotheses and construct experiments that test the validity of those hypotheses.
Furthermore, experimental economists have been said, in recent studies, to be
interested in conducting experiments that uncover the validity of sound theories, as well
as experiments that define the source of weakness in poorly developed theories (Smith
1994). Examples of economic experiments of this nature are well founded. Many
detail the impacts of specific changes within certain types of markets on the prices
observed within each market (Adam et al.; Plott et al.). Other recent experiments have
been conducted to evaluate alternative experimental designs for economic experiments.
Examples of these studies evaluate specific issues within the common design of recently
conducted experiments and suggest modifications needed for improvement of
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experimental designs in future research (Palfrey and Rosenthal~ Forsythe et. al.).
Experimental simulation research is closely related to experimental economics
research with th.e main distinction centering around the researcher's inability to employ
substantial amounts of control on the actions of subjects in simulated markets. Recent
experimental simulation research has focused on simulation in the classroom to improve
the student understanding of agricultural markets and how realistic factors affect
agricultural markets such as government regulations (White). Experimental simulation
research has also focused on explaining how experiential learning and economic
simulation are linked (Koontz et al. 1995b). Cooperative learning has been described
to involve the development of higher-order decision-making skills that require the
actions of more than one individual (Koontz et al. 1995c). Experimental simulation
allows the participants of the market to practice many different skills while facing
realistic economic problems. Therefore, combining the two may allow participants to
observe the outcomes and consequences of their decisions (Ward et al. 1996b).
Data
Data for this research project was generated by students of the Agricultural
Economics Course 3990 which was held in weekly 90 minute sessions during the 1995
spring semester at Oklahoma State University. Students were primarily juniors or
seniors and their fields of study included agricultural economics, animal science, and
agricultural education. The project began by allowing the students to trade without
14
experimentation while being instructed on how the Fed Cattle Market Simulator
(FCMS) operates. The FCMS is a simulated fed cattle market developed by Dr.
Stephen Koontz, Dr. Derrell Peel, Dr. Jim Trapp, and Dr. Clement Ward of the
Agricultural Economics Department at Oklahoma State University (Koontz et al.
1994a). The FCMS has been effectively used by its developers in extension education
(Koontz et al. 1994b) and in teaching interested agricultural oriented students in a
classroom setting (Koontz et al. 1995a). It includes eight simulated feedlot firms and
four simulated meatpacking firms, all of which are designed to represent the largest
firms in the fed cattle industry. The FCMS is an experiential learning tool used by its
developers to instruct interested groups of people on decision making processes known
to feedlot marketing and meatpacking procurement managers in the fed cattle market.
Most of these participating groups have been high school and university students,
employees of various agribusiness firms, and agricultural producers. The range of
knowledge levels in these groups is from the high school level to the level of corporate
executives. Fundamental components of the FCMS and details on how the simulator
operates are thoroughly described in detail by previous literature (Ward et aL 1996b;
Koontz et al., 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c).
The nature of the data collected for this study primarily consisted of transaction
prices with associated transaction level and variability information. Data were
collected for approximately 75 weeks of trading between the simulated firms or 2,770
pens of fed cattle. The cattle are bought or sold in pens of 100 hundred head each and
are marketed by the feedlot firms at one of five weight classes (1100, 1125, 1150,
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1175, and 1200 pounds). The number of cattle supplied throughout the marketing
period follows a realistic supply pattern. Thus, the experiment considered the impacts
of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements under both abundant and tight cattle
supply conditions.
Each data record consisted of one transaction which is the sale/purchase of one
simulated pen of 100 steers between one feedlot firm and one meatpacking firm. Data
for each transaction included: week traded, meatpacker purchasing the cattle, feedlot
selling the cattle, weight of cattle traded, agreed upon transaction price, and type of
transaction (cash, forward contract, or exclusive marketing/procurement agreement).
Other data recorded for each week of simulated trading consisted of: break-even prices
for 1150 pound cattle for each feedlot and the largest meatpacker, boxed beef price for
beef sold that week, the closing nearby futures market price for the preceding week,
number of fed cattle marketings from the previous week, and number of pens of cattle
on the show list at the beginning of each trading week. An example of the transaction
cards used in the FCMS data entry system is presented in Appendix A.
Procedure
Methods
The methods used for this project consisted of three linear regression models
that were estimated to test three statistical hypotheses. In addition to the linear
regression models, sample statistics were examined. The statistical hypotheses
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-considered in this study are presented in Table 1. The linear regression models focus
on determining the effects of the exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on the
level and variation of fed cattle transaction prices. These models were estimated for
the entire simulated fed cattle marketing period to consider the level and variation in
both the individual and mean weekly transaction price levels due to exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements and other variables which influence market prices.
In addition, the models mentioned above include variables that explain whether or not
economically rewarding versus not rewarding the subjects of experimental simulation
affects market prices.
The hypothesis tests use sample statistics to evaluate differences in fed cattle
transaction prices and firm profits. The samples were computed for experimental
agreement and non-agreement periods. These tests were conducted in conjunction with
the linear regression models to fulfill the objectives of the study.
Experimental Design
A graphical depiction of the experimental design of this study is presented in
Figure 1. The exact design for collecting the relevant data for this research project was
completed as follows. Students began trading on week 21 without experimentation to
allow each to gain familiarity with the FCMS. After trading a few simulated weeks the
twelve teams were rotated so that each student was allowed the opportunity to pose as
both an upper level marketing manager of a feedlot firm and an upper level
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procurement manager of a meatpacking firm. The first rotation occurred after week 24
and the second occurred after week 28. During these periods, participants of the
experiment were required to complete risk assessment and consent forms concerning
the use of human subjects for economic research. Final teams for the research project
were established prior to week 33. At week 40, the FCMS computer system began the
process of recording team profits, price discovery data, and financial performance data.
This process is documented in previous research (Koontz et al. 1995a). Data was
recorded and stored for each simulated week throughout the entire experimental period
in order to be evaluated on a later date.
Students continued to trade for 36 simulated weeks and then teams were rotated
to begin a 39-week trading period. The above stated 36-week period was divided into
two subperiods (i.e., a 20-week pre-experiment subperiod and a 16-week experiment
subperiod). The above stated 39-week period was divided into three subperiods (i.e., a
20-week pre-experiment subperiod, a 16-week experiment subperiod, and a 3-week
post-experiment subperiod). The entire data collection period began on week 40 and
ended on week 114. Hence, students traded for 36 weeks before switching teams on
week 76. Students then traded for another 39 week experimental period or through
week 114. This period (i.e., the 75 simulated weeks from 40 to 114) will be referred
to as the entire marketing period of the experiment (Figure I). During the entire
marketing period, the two experiments conducted in this research project began. An
overview of these procedures is presented in Appendix B.
Within the two periods discussed above (i.e., weeks 40-75 and weeks 76-114)
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-there were two experimental subperiods each being 16 weeks in duration. The first
experiment of this study involved imposing an exclusive marketing/procurement
agreement during these two 16 week periods between the largest meatpacking firm
(Packer #4) and the two largest feedlot firms (Feedlot #2 and Feedlot #5). The
participating firms were informed that the agreement was to become active only at the
beginning of the first week of the agreement and were not informed as to how long the
agreement extended into the future. The non-participating firms were not informed on
any details of the agreement. However, an announcement (i.e., much like a brief press
release) was made to the entire simulated market. The nature and mechanics of the
marketing agreement were given and explained to the participating firms outside of the
simulated market so that non-participating firms had no means of determining the
details of the agreement. The general structure of the formula based exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements used in this study is presented in Table 2.
Under the agreement, Feedlots #2 and #5 marketed all their cattle when they
reached 1150 pounds to Packer #4. The 1150 pound weight class has been determined
to be the optimal weight for medium framed cattle within the FCMS in relation to the
marketability of finished steers (Koontz et al. 1994a). Within the agreement, each
participating finn negotiated profit-sharing prices based on the difference between
Packer #4's break-even price for 1150 lb. steers and the feedlots' break-even price for
1150 lb. steers. Examples of how these transactions were agreed upon are presented in
Table 3. It is important to note that Packer #4 dealt with Feedlots #2 and #5 on an
individual basis. Accordingly, Feedlots #2 and #5 did not market finished cattle to
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-Packer #4 as a collective group. All transactions produced by the agreements were
recorded as a unique type of contract (i.e., marketing method 3) by the FCMS system.
The second experiment involved rotating periods of rewarding the students
based on their profit performance in randomly-selected four-week to seven-week
periods which were interspersed by randomly-selected four-to-seven week periods of
not rewarding the students (Figure 1). Total periods of reward versus non reward were
equal (16 weeks in each subperiod). This experiment was structured according to the
traditional induced value theory that is outlined in experimental economics literature.
Smith (1976), formally introduced induced value theory by describing the sufficient
conditions for controlling subject preferences in an economic experiment. These
conditions are noted to be nonsatiation or monotonicity, salience, dominance, and
privacy (Smith 1976, 1982). The present experiment is averse to controlling the
actions and/or preferences of the subjects, but is focused on the importance of a reward
medium in experimental simulation studies. Hence, the conditions set out for induced
value theory will be discussed.
Friedman and Sunder define the three sufficient conditions of induced value
theory. The first of which is known as monotonicity which generally means that
subjects (students in this case) must prefer more of the reward provided by the
researcher to less. Accordingly, the subjects' desire for the reward must be prominent
enough to prevent them from becoming satisfied with the experimental setting to the
point of boredom. The second sufficient condition is salience. This condition is
commonly noted when the process by which the reward medium changes depends upon
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the actions of each individual subject as well as the actions of other agents within the
experimental market. Furthermore, the subjects' actions must be defined according to
the rules set out by the institutions of the particular market in question (Friedman and
Sunder). Therefore, subjects of laboratory experiments must fully understand the rules
and responsibilities related to each buying and selling entity of a given market (i.e.,
feedlot and meatpacking firm interrelationships in the fed cattle market). The third
condition is dominance or privacy which in simplest terms means that the subjects'
utility from the experiment must come predominantly from the reward medium and that
other influences have no effect. In this study, attention was given to the design of the
experiment in order to determine whether or not subjects of experimental simulation are
further motivated when provided with the above stated induced value theory conditions.
Students had no knowledge of when they were getting rewarded for their
performance until the beginning of each reward period and they were not informed as
to how long each reward period extended into the future. In addition to announcing
that a reward period had begun, each firm was presented with an explanation of how
they were getting rewarded at the beginning of the marketing period (week 40). The
explanation involved specifying a formula to be calculated at the conclusion of each
week within a given reward period. The formula used to calculate weekly rewards per
firm was based on the financial performance of the respective firm. Hence, the nature
of the reward system in this study revolved around each team's .financial performance.
Specifically, teams were rewarded based on their average profit per head calculated by
the FCMS system and presented to each simulated firm through profit or loss
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statements at the conclusion of each trading week. Students shared a total of $900 or
approximately $20 per person. All firms were given a beginning balance of $10.
After the initial balance, each tearn' s profit/head was monitored and as profit/head
increased or decreased by $1, payment also increased or decreased, respectively, by
$.02/dollar of profit/head. However, complete payment was not awarded until the
final week of the experiment. Examples of the mechanics of the reward system and
corresponding profit or loss calculations are presented in Table 4. Examples of firm
profit/loss figures accounted for in each week of the above mentioned experimental
periods are presented in Appendix C.
In addition to being participants of experimental simulation experiments,
students were required to complete a survey designed to reflect their observations of
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements in the fed cattle market (Appendix D).
This provided data that would allow the evaluation of how each student observed the
exclusive marketing/procurement agreement affecting the performance of their
respective firm and the simulated market, whether they participated in the exclusive
marketing/procurement agreement or not. Surveys were collected and will be
evaluated in future research. Hence they were not considered in this study.
Transaction Price Models
Econometric models were used to examine the questions implied in each specific
objective of this study. The first econometric model is a transaction price level model
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(Model A) which was developed to explain how exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements affect the level of transaction prices within the fed cattle market. The
initial transaction price level model (Model A) is specified and was estimated as
follows:
8 4 2 2
'L u 6PFDLT;jt + 'L U7PPKRjjt + IUgPMPA jjt + 'L u 9PRNRjjl
j=1 j=1 ';=1 j=1
2 2
+ L U IOjDMAPijt + L U lIPNMPij\ + Vi\ .
j=l ';=1
where, t = time in simulated weeks = 40, 42, 43, ... , 114 and i = observations within
a week = I, 2, 3, ... , Nt. The definition of each variable and the expected sign for
each coefficient is presented in Table 5. The pooled cross-section time series model
was estimated for unbalanced panel data because the number of transactions observed
each week was not equal over the 75 week experimental period. Unequal transaction
price observations among weeks are due to the fact that FCMS participants adjust
marketing or procurement strategies in reaction to market changes as needed.
It is not statistically plausible to estimate Model A as shown in equation 1. A
variable from each of the following binary groups must be excluded from the
estimation process: DFDLTijll DPKRijt , DMPA jju DMAPijt , DNMPjjt , and DRNRijt • The
variables that were not included will be referred to the 'base" variables in subsequent
tables and figures. Base variables are noted in Table 5.
Model A is specified as a Weighted Random Effects Model (WREM) and was
estimated for unbalanced panel data using LIMDEP 6.0 econometric software
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follows:
2Var[uJ = au ,
E[uJ = 0,
222Var[eil + uJ = a e + au = a .
heteroskedasticity in the error term (ViJ resulting from the two experiments that were
(4)
(Greene).
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randomized reward/non-reward and agreement/non-agreement periods. The random
known as white noise and the second component measures the random impact that is
has disturbances (ae2 + au2) that are equal. to cl and are assumed to be uncorrelated as
However, for a given t, the disturbances are assumed to be correlated by virtue of their
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity was found among simulated weeks due to the
The WREM model specification was used in this study to correct for multiplicative
(7)
(5)
(3)
Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) regressi.on model that assumes that the error term
(ViJ contains two components
applied to the simulated marketing period (Judge et al.). The WREM is an Estimated
(6)
common component (p = a}/(2) as follows:
common to each simulated week of trading (Judge et al.). The component error term
The first component is randomness of the transaction prices within each week whi.ch is
and
effects model was weighted (WtsiJ to correct for the multiplicative form of
heteroskedasticity as follows:
(10) Wtsit = l/exp(eit 2).
Where ejt 2 represents the squared error or conditional variance for each observation.
The model yielded Estimated Generalized Least Squares estimates for the
relevant economic variables using LIMDEP 6.0 software (Greene). Variations of this
model were estimated to evaluate the robustness of the estimated impacts of the
agreement and reward periods on transaction price levels. Each of the model variations
are presented in Appendix E.
Ward et al. 1996b notes that many of the traditional economic variables of
transaction price models found in previous research are accounted for or held constant
by the FCMS. These variables generally include cattle quality characteristics such as
age, weight, sex, quality grades, yield grades, etc. Reasons for the inclusion of these
types of variables in transaction price models that explain fed cattle prices are well
developed in Jones et al., Schroeder et al., Ward et aI. 1996a, Ward 1981, Ward 1982,
and Ward 1992. As a result, variable explanation at this juncture will focus on those
variables that are specific to this study.
The price of boxed beef (BBP) was lagged one week (t-l) because meatpacking
firms (buying agents) base their procurement decisions on the market information that
has been reported most recently. The price of boxed beef is reported at the conclusion
of each simulated week and represents the price for which boxed beef is sold in that
week. Therefore, buying agents within the FCMS utilize boxed beef prices for fed
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cattle that were purchased in the previous week (i. e., buying agents purchase cattle in
one week and sell beef produced by those cattle the following week). A graphical
depiction of BBPt_1 throughout the simulated marketing period is presented in Figure 2
and the descriptive statistics for BBPt- 1 in different experimental periods are reported in
Table 6. Lagged boxed beef prices were found to be highly correlated with the average
price paid for fed cattle in each simulated week (Figure 2). The rationale for including
the previous week's closing futures market price for the nearby live cattle contract
(LCFMPt_1) is much the same as the rationale for including lagged boxed beef prices
(BBPt_I ). The exception is that both the buying agents and the feedlot firms (selling
agents) formulate marketing/procurement decisions that are based on the closing nearby
live cattle futures market price. A graphical depiction of LCFMPt_1 throughout the
simulated marketing period is presented in Figure 3 and the descriptive statistics for
LCFMPt_1 in different experimental periods are reported in Table 6.
Two specific independent variables were used to represent the supply of fed
cattle. Total number of fed cattle on the show list (TSL) for the previous week (t-l) is
known by all firms within the FCMS. Number of cattle on the show list represents
cattle that can be marketed in the current week (i.e., fed cattle that weigh between
1,100 Ibs. and 1,200 lbs.). Previous research has indicated that this number is
important in forecasting prices in the fed cattle market (Ward et al. 1996b; Bacon,
Trapp, and Koontz). Graphical depictions of TSLt_1 throughout the simulated
marketing period are presented in Figures 1 and 4. Descriptive statistics for TSLt_1 ill
different experimental periods are reported in Table 6. Total number of pens marketed
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in the previous week (TMt_1) is another supply variable that has also been found to
significantly effect prices paid for fed cattle (Schroeder et al.). These two variables
were not found to be highly correlated with one another (Figure 5). An explanation for
this is that the buying agents purchase fed cattle to fulfill a known low cost or optimal
plant capacity during each week of trading. This causes total marketings (TMt-1) to
remain constant relative to the amount of cattle supplied to the market or on the total
show list (TSL t_1) from week to week (Figure 6). Descriptive statistics for TMt_1 in
different experimental periods are reported in Table 6.
When the buying and selling agents of the FCMS approach one another to agree
upon a bid or ask price, they negotiate or bargain until a final transaction price is
reached. The amount for which they negotiate revolves around how to split or share
the available profits or losses in the market at the time of the trade. In order to do this,
participants of the FCMS must estimate the feedlot and meatpacker break-even prices
for fed cattle in each trading period. The difference between the largest meatpacker's
break-even price for the 1150 lb. weight class and the feedlots' break-even price for the
same weight class represents the profits or losses (PPLJ that are available to the market
in week 1. This amount can be shared by the simulated firms in each trading period.
The available profits or losses (PPLJ in this study were used as a measure of the
bargaining range or the distribution of profits or losses between the buying and selling
agents of the FCMS. A graphical depiction of PPLt throughout the simulated
marketing period is presented in Figure 7 and the descriptive statistics for PPLt in
different experimental periods are reported in Table 6.
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Ward et al. 1996b found that significant price differences are observed among
simulated firms due to individual negotiation skills that are unique to each simulated
feedlot and meatpacking finn. Separate variables were included in model A to explain
how each feedlot finn and each meatpacking firm within the FCMS affects transaction
prices. Hence, there are eight variables which represent the feedlot finns (DFDLTijJ
and four variables that represent the meatpacking firms (DPKRijJ. These variables
provide an indication of the overall effects that each finn has on fed cattle prices in
relation to one other firm. Descriptive statistics of each firm's transaction prices are
presented in Table 7. Graphical depictions of mean prices observed by each feedlot
firm and each meatpacking firm are presented in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
Previous research has evaluated the impacts of captive supplies on market
transaction prices (Schroeder et aI.; Ward et aI. 1996a). However, little research has
been conducted to contrast the response of market transaction prices during active and
non-active agreement periods. An additional set of variables were included in the
model to represent the effects of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on the
transaction prices paid/received for fed cattle. The first of these variables indicates
how market transaction prices differ during periods where there were exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements (DMPAijJ versus those periods where there were no
agreements. The second marketing/procurement agreement variable in the model
represents the prices experienced by participating firms of the exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements during agreement periods (DMAPijJ compared to
the prices experienced by non-participating firms during same market periods (i.e.,
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market periods where active agreements were being utilized). A third agreement
variable was included in the model to measure differences between prices experienced
by participating firms of the exclusive marketing/procurement agreements during
periods when there were no active agreements (DNMPijJ compared to the prices
experi.enced by the non-participating firms the same periods (i.e., market periods when
there were no active agreements being utilized). Graphical depictions of participant
and non-participant prices (DMAPijt and DNMPijJ throughout the simulated marketing
period are presented in Figures 10 and 11. The descriptive statistics for participant and
non-participant prices (DMAPijl and DNMPijJ in both agreement and non-agreement
experimental periods are reported in Table 8.
This study also evaluates the effects of rewarding market participants on
transaction prices for fed cattle within the FCMS. Rewarding participants of
experimental markets has been used as a tool which provides the control of subject
preferences (Smith 1976, 1982; Plott). In this study, significant changes in subject
preferences are hypothesized to be reflected in the market prices that are produced by
participants of the FCMS. Under the salience condition set out by Friedman and
Sunder, the reward medium should prevent subjects from becoming bored, which is
noted as an important reason for using cash rewards over other types of reward
mediums. Tran.saction price differences are evaluated in this study during randomized
periods of rewarding the subjects (DRNRijJ versus market periods where the subjects
are not being rewarded. A significant coefficient for the reward period variable in this
study could mean students did experience behavior and preference changes during
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market periods where rewards were being offered. Descriptive statistics for fed cattle
transaction prices during reward and non-reward periods (DRNRijJ are presented in
Table 9.
Transaction Price Variance Models
The second econometric model (model B) is a transaction price variability
model used to explain how exclusive marketing/procurement agreements affect the
variance of transaction prices. The dependent variable (VI'PFCiJ of model B is
represented by the natural logarithm of the squared residuals from model A which serve
as estimates of the variance about the conditional mean of the dependent variable or the
level of transaction prices (Judge et. al.). A more precise definition of VI'PFCit can be
found in Table 5. Graphical depictions of VTPFCil throughout the simulated marketing
period for participants and non-participants are presented in Figures 12 and 13,
respectively. The descriptive statistics for participant and non-participant price
variance estimates (VTPFCiJ in different experimental periods are reported in Table 10.
Model B was estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares technique for
unbalanced panel data with the traditional assumptions for the Classical Linear
Regression Model (CLRM) employed by LIMDEP 6.0 econometric software (Greene).
Model B utilizes the same independent variables and subscript notations that appear in
model A. The base transaction price variability model is specified and was estimated
as follows:
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The model produced OLS estimates of the impacts that the identified variables
have on the variability of transaction price levels in the simulated fed cattle market. A
fragility analysis was also conducted by using the squared residuals from an OLS
transaction price level model with the same independent variables as model A. The
resulting variance model is identical in specification and estimation with the exception
of specifying OLS squared residuals as the dependent variable instead of the WREM
squared residuals. The main reason for this consideration is centered around the fact
that the WREM model most likely does not produce residuals that are the best estimates
of the standard deviation around the conditional mean. This is due to the fact that the
WREM corrects for multiplicative heteroskedasticity using the Estimated Generalized
Least Squares technique. However, the results from both types of residual variance
models were similar and the conclusions about marketing agreement and reward period
impacts on the variability of transaction prices derived from each were identical.
The rationale for including the variables of the transaction price level model in
the residual variance model are similar to the rationale for each that has been discussed
above (Table 5). The definition of each remains the same but their hypothesized
impacts on the variability of transaction prices may be different. The main reason for
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using the traditional transaction price variables found in model A in this study is that
variables explaining levels of transaction prices are assumed to also explain the
variability of transaction prices. Hence, discussion of variable rationale is limited to
the hypothesized relationships between exclusive marketing/procurement agreements
and the variability of transaction prices.
There have been numerous studies detailing the overall impacts of exclusive
marketing agreement impacts on transaction prices. However, none have considered
the impacts that these agreements have on the variability of fed cattle prices. The
agreement variables used in model A are used in model B to determine how market
transaction price variances differ during periods of active versus non-active exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements. DMPAijt explains the difference in transaction
price variances during market periods where agreements are active versus transaction
price variances during non-active agreement periods. DMAPijl represents the difference
in transaction price variances experienced by the participating firms of the agreements
during active agreement periods compared to the transaction price variances
experienced by the non-participating firms during the same periods. DNMPijt is used to
explain the transaction price variances experienced by the participating firms during
non-active agreement periods versus the transaction price variances experienced by the
non-participating firms during the same periods.
The impacts of rewarding FCMS participants on transaction price variances was
also evaluated by this study. Significant price variance impacts due to rewarding
students may be caused by changes in subject preferences during the reward periods.
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DRNRijt represents the transaction price variances experienced by FCMS participants
during reward periods compared to the transaction price variances experienced by the
participants during trading pe.riods where no rewards were being offered.
Weekly Price Models
An additional set of econometric models were used to examine exclusive
marketing/procurement agreement impacts on weekly transaction price levels.
Specifically, model C is specified to determine the manner in which exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements affect mean weekly transaction price levels
(AVGPRCJ within the fed cattle market. Variations of this model were estimated in the
same manner as estimated for model A to evaluate the robustness of estimated
agreement related impacts on weekly transaction price levels. Each of the model
variations are presented in Appendix E. These models are specified as Autocorrelated
Classical Linear Regression Models (ACLRM). The models yielded OLS estimates of
the relevant economic variables that were corrected for first order autocorrelation. The
initial mean weekly transaction price model (model C) is specified and was estimated as
follows:
2 2
:L CX 6PMPAjt + :Lcx7jDRNRj, + fi·
~l ~1
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Definitions and rationale for the variables in model C are, for the most part,
identical to those discussed for model A with minor exceptions. The first exception is
that instead of specifying individual transaction prices as the dependent variable, the
mean transaction price for each week (A VGPRC;) is specified. This allows the
evaluation of exclusive marketing/procurement agreement impacts on weekly market
transaction prices for fed cattle. Agreement and non-agreement periods (DMPAjJ are
the agreement related variables in this model which represents weekly market prices for
fed cattle during the weeks where active agreements existed versus trading weeks where
there were no active agreements in place (fable 5).
The impacts of reward periods on weekly prices were also considered by this
study. A significant impact of reward periods on weekly prices observed in the FCMS
could mean that subject preferences were substantially changed much like reward
period impacts on transaction price levels in model A. DRNRjl represents the weekly
prices experienced by the participants of the FCMS during reward periods compared to
periods where no rewards were being offered.
Sample Statistic Differences
Several further hypothesis tests were specified and tested to evaluate sample
differences between the participating and non-participating firms of the exclusive
marketing procurement agreements. Sample differences of interest included
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participant/non-participant profit levels, participant/non-participant profit variability,
participant/non-participant transaction price levels, and participant/non-participant
transaction price variability. These tests involved the use of sample means and
variances of transaction prices and weekly firm profits. Details about the null and
alternative hypothesis and the market periods considered by these tests are presented in
Table 1.
The usual (-statistic used for determining the difference between two means
(Xl and X2) from independent samples is as follows:
with observations in each sample (nl and n2) and a pooled variance S2. This t-statistic
is used under the assumption that the variances in each sample are equal. In this study
the variances in each sample are not assumed to be equal. The approximate (-statistic
used under this assumption is
The approximated t-statistic considers unequal pooled variances (s) 2 and S22) for each
independent sample (Satterthwaite 1946). Satterthwaite 1946 noted an accurate
approximation of the degrees of freedom (dt) for t-tests involving unequal variances.
The Satterthwaite's approximation for df was used in this study which is calculated as
(13)
In addition to testing for differences in sample means, the folded form of the F-
statistic (P') was used to test for differences in sample variances (Steel and Torrie).
The F' is calculated from the pooled variances as follows:
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-(14) F' = (larger of SI 2, S2, 2) / (smaller of S1 2, S2, 2).
The F' is a two-tailed F-statistic, since it is not known which of the pooled variances
(S,2 and S2, 2) are larger. The null hypothesis considered in a F' is that the variances of
two independent samples are equal (o} = 0/).
The first set of tests involve testing whether or not the mean and variance of
prices observed by the participants were significantly different from the mean and
variance of prices observed by the non-participants in periods when
marketing/procurement agreements were active versus periods when
marketing/procurement agreements were not active. The second set of tests involved
testing whether or not the mean and variance of weekly profits observed by the
participants were significantly different from the mean and variance of weekly profits
observed by the non-participants in periods when marketing/procurement agreements
were active versus periods when marketing/procurement agreements were not active.
The third set of statistical hypothesis tests determine whether or not the mean and
variance of transaction prices during reward periods were different from the mean and
variance of transaction prices during non-reward periods. All of these hypothesis tests
were conducted in the same format. The general format for the tests concerning the
means of prices and profits is presented in Table 11 . Accordingly, the general format
for the tests concerning variances of prices and profits is presented in Table 12. In
addition to the basic formats, the statistics and hypothesis involved in each test are
summarized in Table 1.
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-Empirical Results and Discussion
Model Results
The transaction price level model (model A) explained over 80 percent of the
variation in fed cattle transaction prices (Table 13). Model A was found to be highly
significant with an F-statistic of 773.19 and yielded estimates of the relevant economic
variables that had been corrected for multiplicative heteroskedasticity within each week
and serial correlation throughout the weeks considered by the experimental trading
periods. The random effects in model A were found to be highly significant in relation
to the specification of the statistical model. In general, this reduced the significance of
the independent variables that remained constant within each week of the experimental
trading period. The transaction price variability model (model B) exhibited an
expectedly low explanation (7.23 percent) of the variation in the variance estimates
(Table 13). However, the model was found to be significant at the 1 percent level with
an F-statistic of 11.91.
The weekly mean transaction price model (model C) explained over 90 percent
of the variation in weekly fed cattle transaction prices (Table 14). Model C was found
to be significant with an F-statistic of 108.87 and produced estimates of the relevant
economic variables that were corrected for first order autocorrelation. The estimated
results for each coefficient in models A, B, and C are presented in Tables 13 and 14.
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In addition, estimated results from the robustness analysis for exclusive
marketing/procurement agreement and reward/non-reward coefficients are presented in
Table 15 for model variations of A and C.
Sample Mean and Variance Differences
The mean and variance of prices between participating and non-participating
firms of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements were found to be statistically
different in this study under the assumption that price variances were different between
agreement and non-agreement sample periods. Price means and variances in each
sampling period considered by this study are presented in Table 16. Firms that were
participants of the agreements were found to experience a $O.27/cwt lower mean price
than non-participating firms during the agreement periods. Participating fums also
experienced significantly lower price variances than non-participating firms during
active agreement periods (Table 16). Conversely, participating firms did not
experience significantly higher mean prices than non-participating firms by $0.49/cwt
during the non-agreement sample periods. Sample variances between participating and
non-participating firms were not found to be significantly different during the non-
agreement sample periods (Table 16).
The mean and variance of weekly profits between participating and non-
participating firms of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements were also found to
be statistically different in this study under the assumption that weekly profit variances
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were different between agreement and non-agreement sample periods. Graphical
depictions of feedlot and meatpacker profits are presented in Figures 14 and 15 ,
respectively. Descriptive statistics for meatpacker and feedlot profits during agreement
and non agreement periods are presented in Table 17. The means and variances of
weekly profits for each sampling period considered by this study are presented in Table
16. Participants of the agreements were not found to experience weekly mean profits
that were significantly different than non-participating firms during the non-agreement
periods. However, participating firms did experience a significantly lower variance in
weekly profits compared to the non-participating firms during the non-agreement
periods. Weekly mean profit differences between participating and non-participating
firms during the agreement periods were also found to be statistically insignificant.
However, weekly profit variances were found to be significantly lower for participating
firms than for non-participating firms, during agreement periods (Table 16).
Participant and non-participant weekly mean profits were not found in this study to be
significantly different between the agreement and non-agreement periods. However,
the participating firms did experience significantly lower profit variances during the
agreement than during non-agreement periods (Table 16). Weekly profit variances
between agreement and non-agreement periods were not found to be significantly
different for the non-participating firms.
Sample statistic differences between reward and non-reward periods were also
considered in this study. Mean prices between reward and non-reward periods of the
experiment were not found to be statistically different under the assumption that price
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variances were different between reward and non-reward sample periods. However,
price variances were found to be significantly higher during reward periods than during
non-reward periods (Table 16).
Traditional Price Discovery Model Variables
The lagged boxed beef price (BBPt_l ) has been found in previous research to be
significantly related to fed cattle transaction prices. In this study, the coefficient for
BBPt_1 was found to be significant and positively related to simulated fed cattle
transaction prices (Table 13). Specifically, fed cattle transaction prices are found to
increase by $0.33/cwt. with a $1/cwt. increase in the lagged boxed beef price (BBPt_I ).
Similarly, BBPt_1 was found to be significant and positive in its relationship to the
weekly mean of simulated fed cattle transaction prices. Weekly mean fed cattle
transaction prices are found to increase by $0.22/cwt. with a $11cwt. increase in the
lagged boxed beef price (BBPt_I ). These findings are consistent with relevant economic
theory concerning derived demand and parallel to findings in previous research
(Schroeder et aI.; Ward et al. 1996b; Ward 1992). Lagged live cattle futures market
prices (LCFMPH ) have also been found in previous research to have significant positive
impacts on fed cattle transaction prices (Schroeder et al.; Ward 1981, 1982, 1992).
Lagged live cattle futures market prices in this study were also found to be positive and
significant. Fed cattle transaction prices were found to increase by $0.27/cwt. for
every $1/cwt. increase in the lagged live cattle futures market price. Accordingly,
weekly mean fed cattle transaction prices were found to increase by $0.16/cwt. for
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every $l/cwt. increase in the lagged live cattle futures market price.
The relationships between the two cattle supply related variables used in this
study and fed cattle transaction prices are consistent with one another and with
economic theory about how changes in the quantity supplied impacts prices within a
given market. The total supply of cattle in the market window or the number of cattle
available for purchase within a given week is known as the number of cattle on the total
show list. This type of information is not publicly reported in the real-world market.
However, private organizations often attempt to collect show list data from their
members (Ward et al. 1996b). The total number of pens of cattle (100 hd.lpen) on the
show list for the previous week (TSL1_1) was found in a previous study to have a
negative and significant relationship with fed cattle transaction prices (Ward et al.
1996b). In this study, the coefficient for TSLt_1 was also found to be negative and
signifi.cant in its relationship to both fed cattle transaction prices and the weekly mean
of fed cattle transaction prices. Specifically, simulated fed cattle transaction prices are
found to decrease by $O.OS/cwt. with an additional pen of cattle on the previous week's
show list. Weekly mean fed cattle transaction prices are found to decrease by
$O.08/cwt. with an additional pen of cattle on the previous week's show list. The
number of cattle marketed by feedlots or slaughtered by meatpackers has been
considered in two previous studies. Schroeder et al. found that the number of cattle
marketed or slaughtered significantly affected fed cattle transaction prices. However,
Ward et aI. 1996b did not find that the total number of cattle marketed in each week
significantly impacted simulated fed cattle transaction prices. In the FCMS setting, this
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number is reported at the end of each week. As a result, the subjects are allowed to
use the total number of marketings from the previous week (TMt_1) to fonnulate and
arrive at bid or ask prices for pens of finished cattle. In this study, TMt_1 was found to
have a negative and significant relationship to fed cattle transaction prices, similar to
the impact of TSLt_1• The coefficient indicates that simulated fed cattle transaction
prices decreased by $0.06/cwt. with a one pen increase in the number of pens marketed
for the previous week. The weekly mean of fed cattle transaction prices was not
significantly impacted by the number of pens marketed or slaughtered in the previous
week.
Ward et al. 1996b notes that a specific type of firm behavior is commonly
observed in the FCMS setting that is related to the manner in which meatpacking firms
and feedlot firms share available profits. The authors suggest that feedlot firms are
more often willing to be satisfied with a targeted, cost-plus profit margin that can be
realized under normal market conditions. The authors also suggest that meatpacking
firms more often attempt to gain the highest possible profit available in the market
under given market conditions at the time of negotiation. As a result, when there are
known profits to be shared in the fed cattle market, meatpacking firms commonly
attempt to capture the largest portion of the amount to be negotiated. Much like in the
real world, the subjects of the FCMS are able to calculate the meatpacker and feedlot
break-even price for 1150 lb. cattle from week to week. The difference in the largest
meatpacking firm's break-even price for 1150 lb. cattle and the feedlot firms' break-
even price for 1150 lb. cattle is a proxy in this study for the amount of profits to be
42
shared in a particular week or the bargaining range. This amount will be referred to as
the potential profit/loss for each week (PPLJ. Previous research results have indicated
that there is a negative and significant relationship between PPL. and fed cattle
transaction prices (Ward 1996b). Results found in this study are consistent with
previous findings in that a $l/cwt. increase in the potential profit/loss for each week is
associated with a $0. 15/cwt. decrease in fed cattle transaction prices. The weekly
mean of fed cattle transaction prices was not significantly impacted by a $lIcwt.
increase in the potential profit/loss for each week (model C).
Differences in managerial and negotiation skills exist between individuals within
the firms that participate in most markets. These differences become collective for
each firm as the individuals work together to accomplish a common set of goals.
Previous research has indicated that these collective differences result in different types
of market behavior and performance which is often linked to the price di fferences
among competing firms (Ward et al. 1996b; Carlton and Perloff). Previous research
findings using the FCMS suggests that significant price differences do indeed occur
between the simulated meatpacking and feedlot firms (Ward et al. 1996b). In this
study, several of the simulated feedlot firms (DFDLT1 - DFDLTg) received higher
prices for the cattle that were marketed than the other feedlot firms. Accordingly, two
of the simulated meatpacking firms (DPKR1 -DPKR4) received lower prices for the
cattle that were purchased than the other meatpacking firms. These results are
consistent with previous findings that consider price differences among firms using
real-world data (Jones et al.; Schroeder et al.; Ward 1982, 1992, 1996a). Significant
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-feedlot firm price differences found here ranged from $0.49/cwt. to $O.22/cwt. higher
than the mean price received by Feedlot #1. Significant price differences among the
meatpacking firms ranged from $0.48/cwt. to $O.32/cwt. lower than the mean price
paid for Meatpacker #1. These results are not consistent with economies of size theory
due to the fact that the smallest meatpacker (#1) paid the highest price on average.
Economies of size studies typically suggest that the largest meatpacking firm can pay
the highest price given that there is adequate inter-firm competition within the market
(Ward 1993). Similar results were found by Ward et al. 1996b where the authors
suggested that these results may be due to the differences in the managerial skills of the
individuals operating the simulated firms.
Exclusive Marketing/Procurement Agreement Variables
Specific types of captive supplies have been found in previous research to have
a negative relationship with fed cattle transaction prices (Schroeder et al.; Barkley and
Schroeder; Ward et al. 1996a). This study examines more closely one type of captive
supplies, exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. To go beyond the general
impacts of captive supplies, this study distinguishes the participating firms of these
agreements during active agreement periods (DMAPt) from the non-participating firms
during the active agreement periods (DMAP2). Results from model A suggest
participants (DMAP1) realized significantly lower mean prices than non-participants
(DMAP2) during active agreement periods which is consistent with previous research
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(Ward et al. 1996a). Specifically, the mean price realized by participants (DMAP1)
was $0.711cwt. lower on average than the mean prices realized by non-participants
(DMAP2) during the active agreement periods. In addition to different mean prices, the
DMAP1 coefficient in model B suggests that participants (DMAP1) realized a
significantly lower price variance by $0.86/cwt. on average than the price variance
realized by non-participants (DMAP2) of the agreements during agreement periods.
This study also distinguishes participants (DNMP1) from non-participants
(DNMP2) during the non-active agreement periods. Results from model A indicate that
participants (DNMPj ) and non-participants (DNMP2) of the agreements did not realize
significantly different mean prices during the non-agreement periods. Furthermore,
results from model B indicate that participants (DNMP1) and non-participants (DNMP2)
did not observe significantly different price variances during the non-active agreement
periods.
Another variable in this study that extends beyond traditional captive supply
studies is the response of market prices during agreement periods (DMPA 1) versus
market prices during the non-agreement periods (DMPA 2). Results from model A
suggest that significant price differences do exist in the fed cattle market between
agreement (DMPA 1) and non-agreement (DMPA2) periods. The coefficient for
agreement periods (DMPA 1) in model A indicates that the mean level of fed cattle
transaction prices was $1.27/cwt. higher during active agreement period than the mean
price level during non-active agreement periods. Additionally, the agreement period
coefficient (DMPA1) in model B suggests that fed cattle transaction prices are
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significantly more variable during agreement periods than during non-agreement
periods. The agreement period coefficient (DMPA t ) indicates that market prices have a
$O.54/cwt. higher variance during agreement periods than during non-agreement
periods. The weekly mean of fed cattle transaction prices was not found to be
significantly impacted by exclusive marketing/procurement agreement periods in model
c.
Economic Reward Variables
Economically rewarding subjects of experimental economic research has been
found to be an effective method of inducing subjects to maintain a high level of interest
while participating in economic experiments. Previous experimental economic research
results suggest that properly rewarding subjects who are rational or who prefer more
income to less controls their individual preferences in such a way that they remain
competitive throughout the duration of the experiment. As a result, the extended
competition allows the market to realistically respond to repeated applications of a
particular economic treatment (Smith 1976, 1982; Plott; Friedman and Sunder). This
study evaluates rewarding the subjects of experimental simulation to determine whether
or not changes in subject preferences and subsequent subject competition impact market
prices. Here, it is hypothesized that any increases in the level of competition due to
preference changes would be reflected by significantly different price levels during
periods where the subjects were being rewarded (DRNR,) than prices during periods
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-where the subjects were not being rewarded (DRNR2). Results from model A indicate
that fed cattle transaction prices are not significantly different between reward (DRNR1)
and non-reward (DRNR2) periods. Likewise, the weekly mean of fed cattle transaction
prices is not found to be significantly different between reward (DRNR.) and non-
reward periods (DRNR2) in model C. However, the reward period coefficient (DRNR1)
in model B suggests that transaction prices are significantly more variable during
periods when the subjects of experimental simulation are rewarded than during periods
when the subjects were not being rewarded. Specifically, the reward period coefficient
(DRNR1) in model B indicates that the subjects observed a $0. 63/cwt. higher variance
during periods when subjects were being rewarded than during periods when subjects
were not being rewarded.
Summary, bnplications~ and Conclusions
This study focused on exclusive marketing/procurement agreements as a captive
supply method. within an experimental simulation setting. This type of agreement is
quickly becoming a common arrangement used by large meatpacking and cattle feeding
firms in the fed cattle market. As a result of structural changes in the fed cattle market
over the past decade, both large and small firms limit the amount of price discovery
data that is available to the public. Experimental simulation enables conducting
economic research that attempts to adequately answer industry and market questions
about how different types of captive supplies affect specific characteristics of the fed
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cattle market. Ward et al. 1996b notes that the Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS)
was developed to provide a realistic market framework and institutional structure whi.ch
allows market participants to compete in an experimental simulation setting. This
setting was used to evaluate the manner in which exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements impact the level and variability of fed cattle transaction prices. By applying
experimental agreements to the simulated market and then observing the response of
market prices, limitations associated with collecting real-world data are overcome.
Data for this study were collected from the FCMS during the Spring 1995
semester at Oklahoma State University. Transaction price level and variability models
were employed to determine the effects of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements
on fed cattle transaction prices. Over 75 weeks of trading were evaluated which
produced 2,770 independent transactions within two experimental periods and four
subperiods.
Many economic variables were found to be generally consistent with a prior
FCMS study (Ward et al. 1996b) and other research projects dealing with fed cattle
transaction prices (Jones et al.; Schroeder et a1.; Ward et aI. 1996a; Ward 1981, 1982,
1992). These variables include boxed beef prices from the previous week, live cattle
futures market prices from the previous week, total marketings/slaughter from the
previous week, the individual feedlot firms, and the individual meatpacking firms. The
potential profit/loss within each week and the number of cattle on the show list from
the previous week have also been found to significantly impact fed cattle transaction
prices, but are not available in industry data. Results indicate a significant positive
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relationship exists between fed cattle transaction prices and both lagged boxed beef
prices and lagged live cattle futures market prices. The number of head on the total
show list and the number of cattle marketed each week were consistent with economic
theory in that they had significant negative impacts on fed cattle transaction prices.
The amount of potential profit/loss to be shared by meatpacking and feedlot frrms was
found to have a significant and negative effect on fed cattle transaction prices. This is
parallel to findings in a previous study. The inverse relationship of the potential
profit/loss in a given week to fed cattle transaction prices suggests that feedlots use a
cost-plus strategy that is hypothesized to be followed by cattle feeding firms in previous
research (Ward 1996b).
Differences in prices paid by meatpacking firms were found to be consistent
with previous price discovery research (Ward et al. 1996b), but not consistent with
economies of size theory (Ward 1993). An explanation that is commonly offered for
this discrepancy is that managerial skills differ among individuals within each firm.
These differences are magnified as a group of individuals cooperate to achieve similar
goals which affects the way a feedlot or meatpacking firm or team behaves within a
market. The behavioral differences can be attributed to the manner in which prices
were different between the simulated firms in this study.
The central question to be answered by this study is centered around the impacts
of exclusive marketing/procurement agreements on the level and variability of fed cattle
transaction prices. Research findings indicate that: (1) significant price differences
exist between participants and non-participants of exclusive marketing/procurement
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agreements~ (2) exclusive marketing/procurement agreement transactions had a
significant negative impact on fed cattle transaction prices, and (3) that market prices
are significantly higher during agreement periods than during non-agreement periods.
Results indicate that the meatpacking and cattle feeding firms that enter into exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements realized a significantly lower mean and variance of
prices by $O.711cwt. and $O.86/cwt.~ respectively than those firms that did not enter
into such agreements. Furthermore, participating firms did not realize significantly
different prices than non-participating firms during non-agreement periods. An
implication of this is that cattle feeding firms are willing to accept lower prices and
subsequently lower profits in order to ensure that: (1) cattle on show list inventories
remain current and (2) less variable market prices are realized. On the other hand~ the
meatpacking firm is able to realize lower purchase prices and lower price variability
which may allow the firm to achieve long-run financial stability in exchange for
capturing the absolute maximum profits that are available within the market. A
graphical summary of mean and standard deviation differences of prices for both
participants and non-participants is presented in Figure 16.
During the periods where the participating firms were actively engaged in
agreements~ mean transaction prices realized by the entire market were found to be
$1.27/cwt. higher than pe.riods were there were no active agreements. The price
variance during the active period was also found to be higher by $O.54/cwt. on
average. An explanation offered for this finding is that the exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements create a short-term reduction in the quantity of
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-cattle which are available to the market for an extending time period into the future.
This is done because the largest meatpacking firm secures 83 % or more of its optimal
slaughtering capacity by entering the agreement which is approximately 25 % of the
cattle that are typically marketed or slaughtered from week to week in the FCMS. This
reduction in the supply of cattle causes upward pressure on market prices which
translates into higher mean prices during the active agreement periods. In the midst of
the supply reduction, the firms that are excluded from the marketing/procurement
agreements counter-react by adjusting their marketing or procurement strategies in
order to maximize profits or minimize losses. These strategy adjustments are
hypothesized to cause the more variable market prices as an indirect result of the
exclusive marketing/procurement agreements.
Another question considered by this study is centered around the effects of
economically rewarding or not rewarding the subjects of experimental simulation.
Rewarding the subjects of experimental economic research where the environment is
highly controlled has been found to be an effective method of retaining subject
motivation and controlling subject preferences in economic experiments where the
validity of specific economic theories are to be tested. This study evaluated rewarding
subjects in an experimental simulation setting where very little of the environment is
controlled which allows dynamic interrelationships between both the simulated firms
and the economic variables to react to one another much like in the real world. Results
indicate that mean fed cattle transaction prices are not significantly different during
periods when the subjects of the FCMS system are being rewarded. However,
51
-transaction prices were found to have a significantly higher variance by $O.56/cwt.
during periods when the subjects were being rewarded than during periods of no
economic rewards. An implication of these findings is that rewarding subjects in
experimental simulation settings will not affect their firms' financial performance in a
such a way that the level of market prices are significantly impacted, but it does create
added variability in simulated market transaction prices. The added variability is most
likely caused by the mere reaction of the subjects to the reward periods instead of an
increased motivation which was hypothesized in this study to impact fed cattle
transaction price levels.
Future research involving the use of experimental simulation is possible
provided that an adequate market and institutional structure is developed. The FCMS
is an example of an experimental simulation setting that allows its participants to learn
from the consequences of different types of decisions that are made in the fed cattle
price discovery process. This creates a realistic relationship between the simulated
cattle feeding and meatpacking firms which can be experimentally evaluated by the
application of experimental models of real-world occurrences in the fed cattle market.
The FCMS offers an opportunity to extend the topic considered in this study to
determining the effectiveness of marketing agreements opposed to contracts in securing
desired cattle quality characteristics in a value based marketing system. Beyond captive
supply issues within the fed cattle market, there are growing numbers of fed cattle
market questions that could be adequately addressed using experimental simulation
approaches within the FCMS.
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rTABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MEAN AND VARIANCE HYPOTHESIS TESTS CONSIDERED WITHIN AND BElWEEN
AGREEMENT AND NON-AGREEMENT PERIODS
,
Null Hypothesis (flo) Alternative Hypothesis (Ha)
VI
-:l
Value Considered
Means Between Agreement Periods
Participant Prices3
Non-participant Prices
Participant Profitsb
Non-participant Profits
Means Between Reward Periods
Transaction Prices
Variances Between Agreement Periods
Participant Prices
Non-participant Prices
Participant Profits
Non-participant Profits
Variances Between Reward Periods
Transaction Prices
a All prices are reported in $/cwt.
b All profits are reported in $/1000.
The mean of each value is equal
for the agreement and non-
agreement periods (XI - )(2 = 0) .
The mean of prices is equal
for the reward and non-
reward periods (XI -)(2 = 0).
The variance of each value is equal
for the agreement and non-
agreement periods (a. 2 - (y-,2 = 0).
The variance of prices is equal
for the reward and non-
reward periods (al 2 _ a2 2 =0).
The mean of each value is not
equal for the agreement and
non-agreement periods
(Xl - X2 :t: 0) .
The mean of prices is not
equal for the reward and
non-reward periods
(XI - X2 :t: 0) .
The mean of each value is not
equal for the agreement and
non-agreement periods
(0-. 2 -0"2 2 :t: 0).
The variance of prices is not
equal for the reward and
non-reward periods
(0'.2 -0'2 2 :t: 0).
~
•"".J4 MI nrU'l J./~••--
"' ............... ...,_.-
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TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
Agreement Firms Responsibilities of Each Firm
Meatpacker #4 Responsible for securing up to 83 1/3 % of optimal low cost slaughter (12 pens or 1200 hd.) by purchasing
all of the 1150 lb. steers on inventory in Feedlot #2 and Feedlot #5 at an agreed upon profit/loss sharing
pnce.
Feedlot #2 Responsible for marketing all of its 1150 lb. steers to Meatpacker #4 at an agreed upon profit/loss sharing
price.
Feedlot #5 Responsible for marketing all of its 1150 lb. steers to Meatpacker #4 at an agreed upon profit/loss sharing
pnce.
TABLE 3: EXAMPLES OF EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENTS
,
Example Calculated Marketing/Procurement Agreement Adjustments
Feedlot #2
Packer #4
Week Number 65:
Feedlot #2
Packer #4
~
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $69.00/cwt.
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $72.00/cwt.
BEP Difference = Packer #4 BEP - Feedlot #2 BEP = $3.00/cwt.
Profit/Loss Sharing Price (PLSP) = Packer #4 BEP - (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = Feedlot #2 BEP + (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = $70.50/cwt.
Transaction Profit = $1.50/cwt.
Transaction Profit = $1.50/cwt.
'''\''I4"'II~In, v ...---"'.6...........~ __.-
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rTABLE 3: CONTINUED
Exam~ _ _ Calculated Marketi!lg/Pr~mement Agreement Adjustments
,
~
UI
\0
Week Number 65:
Feedlot #5
Packer #4
Feedlot #5
Packer #4
Week Number 85:
Feedlot #2
Packer #4
Feedlot #2
Packer #4
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $73.50/cwt.
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $72.00/cwt.
BEP Difference = Feedlot #5 BEP - Packer #4 BEP = $1.50/cwt.
Profit/Loss Sharing Price (PLSP) = Packer #4 BEP + (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = Feedlot #5 BEP - (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = $72.75/cwt.
Transaction Loss = ($0.75/cwt.)
Transaction Loss = ($0.75/cwt.)
Calculated Break-Even Price (REP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $73.75/cwt.
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $73.75/cwt.
BEP Difference = Feedlot #2 BEP - Packer #4 BEP = $0
Profit/Loss Sharing Price (PLSP) = Packer #4 BEP + (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = Feedlot #2 BEP - (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = $73.75/cwt.
Transaction Break-Even =: $0
Transaction Break-Even = $0
• In" n. IIrIn ...,~.---
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rTABLE 3: CONTINUED
Example _ Calculated Marketing/ProcuremeI}~ Adjustments
~
~
er-
a
Week Number 85:
Feedlot #5
Packer #4
Feedlot #5
Packer #4
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $70.60/cwt.
Calculated Break-Even Price (BEP) for 1150 lb. Cattle = $72.00/cwt.
BEP Difference = Packer #4 BEP - Feedlot #5 BEP = $1.40
Profit/Loss Sharing Price (PLSP) = Packer #4 BEP + (BEP Difference /2)
PLSP = Feedlot #5 BEP - (BEP Difference / 2)
PLSP = $71.30/cwt.
Transaction Profit = $0.70/cwt.
Transaction Profit = $0.70/cwt.
"n' "' nr,n ..,,~#-V' -_.-
--
rTABLE 4: EXAMPLES OF THE FCMS REWARD SYSTEM
Example Average Profit/Loss Per Head Average Pen Profit/Loss Reward Account Adjusted Balance
(PLHD) (PLP) (RAAB)
Week Number 47:
Feedlot #7 PLHD = $4.50/cwt. PLP = PLHD * Pens Marketed RAAB = Balance From Previous
PLP = $4.50/cwt. * 6 Pens Week8 + (PLP * .02)
PLP = $27.00/cwt. RAAB = $15.00 + $0.54
RAAB = $15.54
Week Number 47:
Packer #1 PLHD = $2.75/cwt. PLP = PLHD * Pens Purchased RAAB = Balance From Previous
PLP = $2.75/cwt. * 9 Pens Week + (PLP * .02)
0\ PLP = $24.75/cwt. RAAB = ($10.50) + $0.50
RAAB = ($10.00)
Week Number 82:
Packer #3 PLHD = ($1. 30/cwt. ) PLP = PLHD * Pens Purchased RAAB = Balance From Previous
PLP = ($1.30/cwt.) * 11 Pens Week + (PLP * .02)
PLP = ($14.30/cwt.) RAAB = $25.00 + ($0.29)
RAAB = $24.71
~
Week Number 82:
Feedlot #1 PLHD = ($5.25/cwt.) PLP = PLHD * Pens Marketed
PLP = ($5.25/cwt.) * 7 Pens
PLP = ($36.75/cwt.)
RAAB = Balance From Previous
Week + (PLP * .02)
RAAB = $0.50 + ($0.74)
RAAB = ($0.24)
~
a Each simulated firm was given a $10.00 account balance at the beginning of the experimental period.
, ,n,.1'4 n, I:rtI! ..... --
"'11>................ -.-
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-TABLE 5: VARIABLE DEFJNITIONS FOR MODELS A, B, AND C WITH
EXPECTED SIGNS
Variables Definition of Variable Expected Sign
Dependent Variables
TPFCt ith transaction price for one pen of fed cattle N/A
($/cwt.) in week t
AVGPRC The weekly mean of fed cattle transaction N/A
prices ($/cwt.) in week t
VTPFCt The natural log of the ith transaction price N/A
variance estimate ($/cwt.) calculated from
model A in week t
Independent Variables
BBPt-l The boxed beef price ($/cwt.) for Choice Yield Positive
Grades 1-3 550-700 lb. carcasses, lagged one
week \,
LCFMPt-l The live cattle futures market closing price Positive ~
($/cwt.) for the nearby contract period, lagged "l2~
one week ;:,
.>
1Mt-] The total number of pens (1 OOhd./pen) Negative ...."2
marketed or slaughtered, lagged one week ~I
TSLt. 1 The total number of pens of cattle Negative c.:)
(lOOhd./pen) on the market ready show list,
lagged one week
PPLt The potential profit or loss per head ($/cwt.) in Negative
week t which is the largest meatpacker's
break-even price for 1,150 lb. cattle less the
mean feedlot break-even price for 1,150 lb.
cattle
DFDL~jl Binary dummy variables distinguishing each Pos./Neg.
individual feedlot firm, j=1-8, 1=FDLT 1
(Base), 2=FDLT2, 3=FDLT4, 4=FDLT4,
5=FDLT5, 6=FDLT6, 7=FDLT7, and
8=FDLT8
DPKRijt Binary dummy variables distinguishing each Pos./Neg.
individual meatpacking firm, j=I-4, I=PKRl
(Base), 2=PKR2, 3=PKR4, and 4=PKR4
DMPAijl Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
active and non-active exclusive
marketing/procurement periods, j=1-2, 1=
Agreement and 2=Non-Agreement (Base)
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TABLE 5: CONTINUED
-
Variables
Independent Variables
DNMPij,
Definition of Variable
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the
participants and non-participants during the
non-active exclusive marketing/procurement
periods, j= 1-2, 1=Participants and 2=Non-
Participants (Base)
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the
participants and non-participants during the
active exclusive marketing/procurement
periods, j=1-2, 1=Participants and 2=Non-
Participants (Base)
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the
economic reward periods, j= 1-2, 1=Reward
and 2=Non-Reward (Base)
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Expected Sign
Pos./Neg.
Pos./Neg.
Pos./Neg.
rTABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TRADITIONAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOUND IN FED CATTLE
PRICE DISCOVERY RESEARCH
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Entire Marketing Period
BBPt_! 125.62 a 5.21 114.01 138.25 75
LCFMP t_1 78.14 2.36 72.10 81.60 75
TSL t_1 113.88 14.68 88.00 146.00 75
TM"t-1 37.13 5.42 20.00 46.00 75
PPLt 2.02 3.37 -5.46 8.95 75
Agreement Periods
BBPt_, 129.07 3.76 123.91 138.25 32
0\
~ LCFMP t_1 78.17 1.59 76.05 81.40 32
TSL t_1 107.16 12.88 88 134 32
1Mt-1 36.56 5.03 20.00 43.00 32
PPL, 2.92 4.05 -5.46 8.95 32
Non-Agreement Periods
BBPt- l 123.05 4.64 114.01 132.65 43
LCFMP t_1 78.12 2.82 72.10 81.60 43
TSL t_\ 118.88 14.04 97.00 146.00 43
1M t -\ 37.56 572 24.00 46.00 43
PPL I 1.34 2.62 -4.44 7.07 43
a Variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 5.
~
~
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rTABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FlRM PRICES DURING AGREEMENT AND NON-AGREEMENT
PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Agreement Periods
DFDLT\3 80.80 1.80 77.50 86.00 154
DFDLT2 b 80.54 2.02 77.22 87.03 161
DFDLT3 81.71 2.03 77.75 86.67 131
DFDLT4 81.27 1.90 78.00 85.35 130
DFDLTs 80.95 2.19 77.10 88.45 138
DFDLT6 81.71 1.97 77.15 85.90 134
DFDLT7 81.32 1.71 77.10 85.50 143
0\ DFDLTg 80.83 2.02 76.25 85.50 167VI
DPKR\ 81.58 1.73 77.50 86.67 221
DPKR2 81.03 2.00 77.75 86.66 241
DPKR3 81.07 1.96 76.25 85.90 303
DP~ 80.93 2.12 77.10 88.45 393
Non-Agreement Periods
DFDLT\ 77.21 3.48 70.00 82.00 195
DFDLT2 77.57 3.32 70.40 82.00 206
DFDLT3 78.14 3.26 71.75 82.75 191
DFDLT4 78.02 3.13 69.80 82.00 200
DFDLTs 78.24 2.82 71.00 81.90 223
,
• I'''. ,,...., II ' .. ~a.Aol)­v Ao ................. -·-
-
r0\
0\
TABLE 7: CONTINUED
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
DFDLT6 77.79 3.34 69.00 82.10 211
DFDLT7 77.52 3.31 69.00 85.50 192
DFDLTg 77.48 3.17 71.50 81.50 194
DPKR1 77.79 3.22 71.10 81.90 301
DPKR2 77.62 3.31 70.00 82.50 372
DPKR3 77.59 3.32 69.00 82.15 447
DP~ 77.99 3. II 70.40 82.75 492
• Variable definitions are presented in table 5.
b Feedlot #2, Feedlot #5, and Packer #4 participated in the exclusive marketing/procurement agreements.
,
~
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TABLE 8: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPANT AND NON-PARTICIPANT PRICES DURING
AGREEMENT AND NON-AGREEMENT PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Entire Marketing Period
Participating Firms 79.00 3.12 70.40 88.45 1162
Non-Participating Finns 79.27 3.32 69 86.67 1608
Agreement Periods
DMAP1 ' 80.93 2.12 77.10 88.45 393
DMAP2 81.20 1.92 76.25 86.67 765
Q\
Non-Agreement Periods
-...J DNMP1 78.01 3.09 70.40 82.75 769
DNMP2 77.52 3.35 69.00 82.50 843
• Variable definitions and their respecive units of measure are presented in table 5.
TABLE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PRICES DURING REWARD AND NON-REWARD PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Reward Periods
DRNR1 79.07 3.49 69.00 88.45 1368
Non-Reward Periods
DRNR2 79.24 2.97 69.00 84.92 1402
• Variable definitions and their respecive units of measure are presented in table 5.
•• c •• ,,., -
v ....,--
rTABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR RESIDUAL VARIANCE ESTIMATES CALCULATED FROM MODEL A
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Entire Marketing Period
Participating Finns 1.52 3.24 O.OOa 26.75 1162
Non-Participating Finns 1.94 3.12 0.00 29.07 1608
Agreement Periods
DMAP1 b 1.45 2.90 0.00 29.07 393
DMAP2 1.82 3.35 0.00 26.75 765
Non-Agreement Periods
0\ DNMP1 1.56 3.41 0.00 26.75 769
00
DNMP2 1.84 3.24 0.00 29.07 843
a Minimum residual estimates in this study are small positive numbers.
b Variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 5.
. ." _---
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Step 6 Conclusion derivation from the comparison of the critical t-value to t*.
a Period A includes agreement period and period B includes non-agreement periods
TABLE 12: HYPOTHESIS TEST FORMATS CONCERNING THE VARIANCE
OF PRICES AND PROFITS
Process
Process
Calculate students t-statistic (t*).
Where, t* = (x 1-x2) j .Jr-(s-l-ZI-n-l-+-s-Z-Z-jn-Z-)
ddf= (S]2 In] +s/ InJ2
an (S]2 I n j )2 I (n) -1) + (s/ I n2l I (n2-1)
Ha : Variance ofvalue i in period A:t:- Variance of value i in period B
Two tailed test under a normal probability distribution function.
H. : Mean ofvalue i in period A :t:- Mean of value i in period B
Level of Significance 5% (u=O.05)
flo : Mean of value i in period A· =Mean of value i in period B
Where, i is one of the selected mean values in Table 1.
I-L,: Variance of value i in period Aa = Variance of value i in period B
Steps
Step 5
Step 1
Step 2
Step 4
Step 3
Steps
Step 1
Step Z
TABLE 11: HYPOTHESIS TEST FORMATS CONCERNING THE MEANS OF
PRICES AND PROFITS
Step 3 Level of Significance 5% (u=O.05)
Step 4 Two tailed test under a normal F-distribution.
Step 5 Calculate the folded form of the F-statistic, the F ' statistic.
Where, F ' = (larger of Sl 2, S2 2 ) I (smaller of Sl 2, S2 2)
Step 6 Conclusion derivation from the comparison of the F ' value to the critical F
yalue
a Period A includes agreement periods and period B includes non-agreement periods
--
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TABLE 13: ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE RELEVANT ECONOMIC
VARIABLES ON FED CATILE TRANSACTION PRICES
Price Level Estimates Price Variability Estimates
Explanatory Variable Model A ModelB
Intercept 24.9020 u* a 3.1753c ***
(3.866) b (7.359)
BBPt-1 0.3277 *u 0.0282 **
(11.272) (1.852)
LCFMPt-1 0.2688 *** -0.0401 **
(3.881) (-1.713)
1Mt - 1 -0.0605 *** -0.0689 ***
(-2.752) (-5.978)
TSLt_1 -0.0498 *** 0.0433 ***
(-4.304) (8.786)
PPLt -0.1460 *** -0.1884 ***
(-3.392) (-7.971)
DFDLT1 Base Base
DFDLT2 0.0816 -1.0901 ***
(0.904) (-3.327)
DFDLT3 0.4948 *** -1.8381 ***
(6.759) (-7.196)
DFDLT4 0.2452 *** -1.5533 ***
(2.916) (-6.122)
DFDLT~ 0.3296 *** -1.0498 ***
(3.577) (-3.211)
DFDLT6 0.2904 *** -1.1419 ..*
(3.710) (-4.594)
DFDLT7 0.2221 *** -1.1254 ***
(2.853) (-4.457)
DFDLTs -0.0095 -1.7957 ***
(-0.121) (-7.119)
DPKR1 Base Base
DPKR2 -0.3254 *** 0.4098 **
(-6.462) (2.112)
DPKR3 -0.4801 *** 0.1343
70
TABLEt3: CON~D
Price Level Estimates Price Variability Estimates
Explanatory Variable Model A Model.B
(-W.247) (0.708)
DPKR4 -0.0672 0.5609 ..
(-0.877) (1.794)
DMPA] 1.2656 ..... 0.5375 .....
(4.006) (2.642)
DMPA2 Base Base
DMAP]
-0.7059 • *'" -0.8581 **
(-6.201) (-1.833)
DMAP2 Base Base
DNMP1 -0.0292 -0.5291 *
(-0.354) (-1.593)
DNMP2 Base Base
DRNR1 0.0373 0.5631 ***
(0.163) (4.559)
DRNR2 Base Base
N 2770 2770
Adjusted R2 0.8423 0.0723
F(19.2750)
d 773.1942 '" *'" 11.9052 ***
a Significance levels are denoted as follows:
....... significant @ the 1% level of significance,
'" '" significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and * significant @ the 10% level of significance.
b All figures presented in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics for each coefficient.
C All coefficient results of model B are reported as the exponential value of each
coefficient.
d The F-statistic in this study was used in a hypothesis test which is structured as
follows:
Null Hypothesis CHo): The estimated coefficients in the respective
model (A or B) are equal to zero.
Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): At least one of the estimated coefficients in
the respective model (A or B) is
significantly different from zero.
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TABLE 14: ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE RELEVANT ECONOMIC
VARIABLES ON THE WEEKLY MEAN OF FED CATILE
TRANSACTION PRICES
Explanatory Variable
Intercept
BBPt- l
LCFMPt-1
TMt-1
TSLt-1
DMPA 1
DRNR2
N
Adjusted R2
F[7. 67) c
Weeldy Price Level Estimates
Model C
48.4350 ..* •
(5.138) b
0.2218 ***
(7.655)
0.1624 *
(1.758)
-0.0275
(-1.130)
-0.0781 ...
(-4.340)
-0.0371
(-0.550)
0.7236
(1.636)
Base
-0.1781
(-0.645)
Base
75
0.9192
108.8740 ...
a Significance levels are denoted as follows:
*** significant @ the 1% level of significance,
*. significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and * significant @ the 10% level of significance.
b All figures presented in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics for each coefficient.
C The F-statistic in this study was used in a hypothesis test which is structured as
found in table 12 except with respect to model C.
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TABLE 15: ESTJMATED IMPACTS OF AGREEMENT AND REWARD
VARIABLES ON FED CATILE TRANSACTION PRICES
ACROSS ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Explanatory Variable ofInterest
Alternative Models DMPAl a DMAP, DNMP, DRNRJ Adjusted R2
Transaction Models
A1-1 b 1.2656***c -0.7059*** -0.0292 0.0373 0.8423
(4,006t (-6.201) (-0.354) (0.163)
AI-2 0.9234*** -0.6250*** 0.0718 -0.1997 0.8536
(2.849) (-4.747) (0.741) (-0.825)
Al-3 3.3286*** -0.9171 *** -0.2289 -0.2377 0.7717
(3.892) (-4.010) (-1.552) (-0.782)
A2-1 1.0531 *** -0.6671 *** -0.0218 0.1038 0.8327
(3.334) (-5.454) (-0.242) (0.446)
A2-2 0.4386 -0,7610*** -0.0246 -0.1859 0.8215
(1.371) (-4.809) (-0.228) (-0.739)
A2-3 2.7290* "'* -0.7913*** -0.1155** 0.1922 0.7394
(6.162) (-9.732) (-2.182) (0.493)
AJ-l 1.1065**'" -0.6889*** -0.0116 0.0780 0.8202
(3.482) (-5.527) (-0.013) (0.332)
AJ-2 0.43217 -0.7987*** -0.0605 -0.2284 0.8191
(1.276) (-5.262) (-0.582) (-0.845)
AJ-3 2.7704*** -0.8542*** -0.1788*** 0.1782 0.7289
(6.252) (-9.002) (-2.874) (0.456)
A4-1 1.8077'"*'" -0.9425*** -0.2380** 0.2718 0.7937
(5.275) (-7.079) (-2.488) (-0.995)
A4-2 1.1112** -0.7732*** -0.1168 -0.2058 0.6759
(2.444) (-4.677) (-1.028) (-0.560)
A4-3 3.5450*** -0.8856*** -02343*** 0.3881 0.6810
(8.556) (-11.923) (-4.863) (0.933)
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TABLEtS: CONTUNUED
Explanatory Variable ofInterest
AJternatjye Models DMPAI DMAPJ DNMP. DRNR1 Adjusted R2
Weekly Models
Cl-1 0.7236 N/Ac N/A -0.1781 0.9192
(1.636) (-0.645)
Cl-2 0.4885
-0.2330 0.9214
(1.057) (-0.895)
CI-3 0.4423 0.4423 0.9019
(-1.130) (-0.780)
C2-1 0.6404
-0.1670 0.9190
(1.492) (-0.612)
C2-2 0.4747
-0.2294 0.9197
(1.044) (-0.875)
C2-3 0.5694
-0.0887 0.8678
(0.956) (-0.269)
C3-1 0.6261 -0.1695 0.9187
(1.425) (-0.627)
C3-2 0.4359 -0.2061 0.9204
(0.962) (-0.804)
C3-3 0.7004 -0.1521 0.8589
(1.159) (-0.446)
C4-1 0.3538 -0.0491 0.9123
(0.739) (-0.187)
C4-2 0.3431 -0.0610 0.9125
(0.723) (-0.237)
C4-3 0.6189 -0.0595 0.8561
(1.021) (-0.179)
a Variable definitions and base specifications can be found in table 5.
b Each model considered in the robustness analysis is specified in Appendix E.
C Significance levels are denoted as follows:
"''''* significant @ the 1% level of significance,
... '" significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and '" significant @ the 10% level of significance.
d All figures presented in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics for each coefficient.
e Participant and Non-Participant prices were not considered in weekly models.
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TABLE 16: MEAN AND VARIANCE HYPOTHESIS TEST RESULTS
Value Considered Mean Std. Deviation Calculate I-statistic Folded F-statistic
Prices
Participant Prices in Period A a 80.93 2.12 -18.908 *** b 2.13 ***
Participant Prices in Period B 78.01 3.09 (1066) c (768,392)
Non-Participant Prices in Period A 81.20 1.92 -27.347 *** 3.03 ***
Non-Participant Prices in Period B 77.52 3.35 (1366) (842,764)
Participant Prices in Period A 80.93 2.12 2.129 ** 1.21 **
Non-Participant Prices in Period A 81.20 1.92 (728) (392,764)
--.I
VI
Participant Prices in Period B 78.01 3.094 -1.350 0.98
Non-Participant Prices in Period B 77.52 3.349 (1610) (842,768)
Profits
Participant Profits in Period A 6838.31 186465.80 0.974 1.72 ***
Participant Profits in Period B 20715.08 237646.09 (222) (128,95)
Non-Participant Profits in Period A 771.22 237497.29 0.327 1.04
Non-Participant Profits in Period B 7797.84 279404.45 (625) (386,287)
TABLE 16: CONTINUED
Value Considered
Profits
Participant Profits in Period A
Non-Participant Profits in Period A
Participant Profits in Period B
Non-Participant Profits in Period B
Reward vs. Non-Reward Prices
Mean Std. Deviation Calculate (-statistic Folded F-statistic
6838.31 186465.80 0.305 2.15 ***
771.22 237497.29 (239) (287,95)
20715.08 237646.09 -0.511 1.38 **
7797.84 279404.45 (255) (386,128)
-.J
C'I
Reward Periods
Non-Reward Periods
79.07
79.25
3.493
2.973
1.466
(2677)
1.38 ***
(1367,1401)
• Agreement periods are Period A and Non-Agreement periods are Period B.
b Significance levels are denoted as follows:
*** significant @ the 1% level of significance,
** significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and * significant @ the 10% level of significance.
C Calculated degrees of freedom (df) are reported in parenthesis for both t* and F '.
TABLE 17: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FIRM PROFITS DURING AGREEMENT AND NON-AGREEMENT
PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Agreement Periods
Industry -0.32 a 134.34 -449.38 267.22 34
Feedlots -3.08 68.39 -179.28 110.61 34
Meatpackers 2.67 168.89 -559.99 443.39 34
DFDLT\b 47442.26 268275.94 445270.00 573432.00 34
DFDLTzc 20859.74 235688.67 -445800.00 789663.00 34
DFDLT3 -28347.03 251550.70 -413934.00 436394.00 34
DFDLT4 -64877.74 234221.93 -438380.00 629082.00 34
-.I DFDLTs -54025.24 149634.87 -346584.00 263454.00 34
-.I
DFDLT6 -26056.94 147797.48 -283890.00 340172.00 34
DFDLT7 20301.44 234184.46 -351521.00 611089.00 34
DFDLTg 87609.15 287682.69 -462786.00 790450.00 34
DPKR\ 31692.40 287682.69 -462786.00 790450.00 34
DPKRz 45162.15 344389.15 -985320.00 830420.00 34
DPKR3 -81636.22 324609.65 -110088.00 102015.00 34
DP~ 85268.21 164709.62 -399456.00 508060.00 34
Non-Agreement Periods
Industry 21.71 125.77 -279.44 291.44 41
Feedlots 11.37 67.52 -118.83 138.38 41
Meatpackers 10.35 164.88 -342.42 410.28 41
Table 17: Continued
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
DFDLT1 16052.20 206434.16 -433880.00 421880.00 41
DFDLT2 -2847.61 192955.87 -446255.00 387306.00 41
DFDLT3 35952.88 274690.19 -464775.00 119827.00 41
DFDLT4 40674.05 266439.42 -580950.00 749474.00 41
DFDLTs 51229.17 187961.75 -397380.00 399698.00 41
DFDLT6 45222.24 200652.55 -372513.00 514339.00 41
DFDLT7 -11485.07 234478.51 -594815.00 664678.00 41
DFDLTs -68946.54 254325.63 -596493.00 472647.00 41
DPKR\ -12323.76 363741.12 -770421.00 841868.00 41
-.l DPKRz 11764.76 156277.83 -351729.00 387770.00 4100
DPKR3 24698.80 458890.22 -105899.00 104639.00 41
DPKR4 21215.56 315404.51 -932332.00 770452.00 41
a Industry and firm profits are reported as weekly profits ($/1 000).
b Variable definitions are presented in table 5.
c Feedlot #2, Feedlot #5, and Packer #4 participated in the exclusive marketing/procurement agreements.
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FIGURE 2: A COMPARISON OF LAGGED BOXED BEEF PRICES (BBPt-1) TO THE WEEKLY MEAN OF
TRANSACTION PRICES (A VGPRCt) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 3: A COMPARISON OF LAGGED LIVE CATTLE FUTURES MARKET PRICES (LCFMPPt_l ) TO THE
WEEKLY MEAN OF TRANSACTION PRICES (AVGPRC) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 4: LAGGED TOTAL SHOWLIST (TSLt-1) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 5: A COMPARISON OF LAGGED TOTAL SHOW LIST (TSLt-1) TO LAGGED TOTAL MARKETINGS (TM;-l)
THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 6: LAGGED TOTAL MARKETINGS (TMt -1) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 7: POTENTIAL PROFITILOSS (PPL.) THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
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FIGURE 8: MEAN PRICES BY FEEDLOT FIRM DURING AGREEMENT AND NON-AGREEMENT PERIODS
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rFIGURE 10: PARTICIPANT PRICES DURING AGREEMENT PERIODS
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FIGURE 11: NON-PARTICIPANT PRICES DURING AGREEMENT PERIODS
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FIGURE 14: A COMPARISON OF FEEDLOT PROFITS TO INDUSTRY PROFITS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
EXPE~NTALPERIOD
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FIGURE 15: A COMPARISON OF MEATPACKER PROFITS TO INDUSTRY PROFITS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
EXPE~ENTALPERIOD
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rFIGURE 16: MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRICES FOR PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS
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APPENDIX A: FCMS TRANSACTION CARD
Trading Week
Weight
Current Trading
Week
Cash or Forward
Contract
Week Feeder Cattle
Were Purchased
-
--
-
-
= = = = = = =
- = = - = = = = = = =
-
-
= = = = CJ CJ = = =
- = =
-
= = CJ CJ = CJ =
-
CJ CJ CJ = = CJ CJ = CJ
-
-...
-
Feedlot 1 Pen 2
-
-
show list
- Placement week 13
-... _ Weight' 1100 1125 1150 1175 1200
-
- Week 29 30 31 32 33
-
-
....•••.........................
-
Amount this pen was sold for
-
-
Dollars
-
x10 x1 X 1 x,01
-
-
0 = ·0 DO
-
-
1 0 ·0 01
-
-
2 0 .= 02
Be
-
-
3 0 ·CJ 03
...
-
-
4 = .= =4
-
-
5 = 0 ·0 05
-
-
6 CJ = .= =6
-
-
7 CJ = .= =7
-
-
e =
0 ·0 oe
-
-
9 = = .= =9
-
-
...........•...••.•••....•......
-
Sold to Packer Week Sold
-
I Iing - 1 2 3 4... - CJ 0 CJ =
-
-
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
-
Was this sale contracted?
-
-
NO YES » ~ yes
-
CJ CJ see below
-
-
A••AA~A.&£A•••&&.&••••••••••••••
-
If this is a contract sale
-
Please complete the follow ing.
-
-
Week Contracted
eek -...
-
-
O.S U AG ECON
-
M eatpacker Pu rchas
Forward Contract W
Show List Weight
Feed 10 t Marketing
Transaction Price To
\0 Agreed Upon
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APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURES
;
16 Week Experim ent
Including 4-7 Week
Reward/No-Reward
PeriodsI Estimate Models I
;I Report Conclusions I
Instruction and Trading Rotation of Teams to Gain Familiarity
Without Experimentation • .. With Both Sides of the Market
;
20 Wee Pre-Expenment
Including 4-7 Week
Rward/No-Reward Periods
;
16 Week Experiment
Including 4-7 Week ,Reward/N o-Reward
Periods
I Begin Recording Data I .. -I Select Final Teams I
; Rotatv
lIst 36 Week Period I Teams. .. I 2nd 39 Week Period I
; ! ;
23 Week Pre-Experiment
~ I ol 1 weeK I I I Including 4-7 Week
Rew ard/N o-Reward Periods
APPENDIX C: FCMS END OF WEEK FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
PACKER #4 -- WEEKLY FINANCIAL SUMMARY WEEK 94 a.s.u. AG Economics
----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------
CASH RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
----------------------------------------------------------
Adj. BB Price
125.30
125.43
125.30
125.30
125.30
125.43
125.43
125.43
125.43
125.43
125.43
125.43
Avg.
125.39
Receipts From Sale of Boxed Beef
Transaction summary
Weight
1125
1150
1125
1125
1125
1150
1150
U50
U50
1150
1150
1150
Avg.
1141
Gross Rev.
97664
100652
97664
97664
97664
100652
100652
100652
100652
100652
100652
100652
Avg.
99656
Profit/Head
11.73
21.54
11.73
11.73
11.73
14.07
14.07
14.07
15.79
15.79
15.79
15.79
Profit/Unit
14.49
$ 1195872
Trans. /I
80922
80914
80924
80923
80921
70912
70911
70913
50911
50912
50913
50914
Expenditures
Slaughter Cattle Purchased $ 1595407
Feedlot Weight Price Gross Cost
4 1175 81.00 95175
4 1175 81.00 95175
4 1175 81.00 95175
4 1175 81.00 95175
4 1175 81.00 95175
7 1150 82.10 94415
7 1150 82.10 94415
7 1150 82.10 94415
1 ll50 81.00 93150
6 1150 81.25 93438
6 1150 81.25 93438
6 1I50 81.25 93438
1 1I50 81.00 93150
1 1150 81.00 93150
1 1I50 81.00 93150
8 1125 81.50 91688
8 1125 81.50 91688
$1669927
Trans. II
40914
40912
40913
40915
40911
70923
70922
70921
10923
60924
60925
90923
10922
10924
10921
80931
80932
Processing Cost $ 74520
/I Pens Cost/Pen
12 3210 $ _74056
Receipts Minus Expenditures $ _ 1713
Interest Income (Expen~e! - $ --475768- -
=~~~~~~=~~~~g~==========================================
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-----------
==========================================================BALANCE SHEET
----------------------------------------------------------
Total Assets
Cash Reserves
Cattle in Process (Purchase Value)
Total Liabilities
Loans Payable
Net Worth
Maximum Credit Line Available (50% of Assets)
Residual Credit Available
$ 0
$ 1595407
$ 1297787
$ 5195407
$ 1297787
$ 297620
$ 148810
$ -1148977
----------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------
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Receipts Minus Expenditures
FEEDLOT #4 -- WEEKLY FINANCIAL SUMMARY WEEK 94 a.s.u. AG Economics
==========================================================
_________________5~~g~~~!L~~~~g~~EBPnY~~ _
Receipts From Sale of Cattle $ 941625
Transaction summary
Packer Weight Price Profit/Rd. Trans.U
4 1175 81.00 -3.14 40914
4 1175 81.00 -3.14 40912 /'
4 1175 81.00 -3.14 40913
,
4 1175 81.00 -3.14 40915
4 1175 81.00 -3.14 40911
3 1150 81.00 -1.61 40925
3 U50 81.00 -1.61 40924
3 U50 81.00 -1.61 40922
3 1150 81.00 -1.61 40923
3 1150 81.00 -1.61 40921 Avg. Avg. Avg.
U62 81.00 -2.38
Expenditures $ 421795
Feeder Cattle Purchased ........................................ $ 318115
# Pens Weight Price Cost/Rd.
5 700 90.89 636.23
Feeding Cost · .. ·· .. · .. · $ 103680
U of Pens Totallbs. Cost of
on Feed Grained Gain/lb.
86 215000 0.4822
$ 519830
$ 545Interest Income (Expense) ------------
h P .. $ 520375=~~~~~!~~~~==~~~~=========================================:
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=========================B~lan~:~~=========================
----------------------------------------------------------
Total Assets
Cash Reserves
Cattle on feed (at Purchase Value)
$ 1043228
$ 5559365
$ 6602593
Total Liabilities
Loans Payable $ o
$ o
Net Worth
Maximum Credit Line Available (50% of Assets)
Residual Credit Available
$ 6602593
$ 3301297
$ 3301297
==========================================================
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APPENDIX D: EXCLUSIVE MARKETING/PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT SURVEY
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMiCS
Agricultural Economics 3990
Special Problems in Agricultural Economics
Spring 1995
Name _ Team Number _
The following questions pertain to forward contracts and marketing/purchasing agreements. Answer
each question as accurately as possible based on your experience in the Fed Cattle Market Simulator.
NOTE: Everyone should complete Parts A, B, and C. Answer Part D if your team WAS NOT a
participant in either of the marketing/purchasing agreements. Answer Part E if your team WAS a
participant in either of the marketing/purchasing agreements.
Part A. Forward Contracting
1. What advantages were there for cattle feeders to forward contract fed cattle? (Rank the three
most important factors, where 1=most important, 2= second most important, and 3 = third most
important. )
Rank
a. Reduced price variability
b. Reduced basis variability
c. Guaranteed a buyer for cattle
d. Controlled marketing weight and cost of gain
e. Marketed cattle at higher prices
f. Other
Rank
L
2. What advantages were there for packers to forward contract fed cattle? (Rank the three most
important factors, where 1= most important, 2 = second most important, and 3=third most
important. )
a. Reduced price variability
b. Reduced basis variability ---
c. Guaranteed a given quantity of cattle
d. Increased leverage in the cash market ---
e. Controlled timing of deliveries ---
f. Purchased cattle at lower prices ---
g. Other
101
Check if correct
Part B. Exclusive Marketing/Purchasing Agreements
3. What advantages were there for cattle feeders who marketed fed cattle by marketing/purchasing
agreements? (Rank the three most i.mportant factors, where 1= most important, 2 = second most
important, and 3= third most important.)
Rank
a. Reduced price variability
b. Reduced basis variability
c. GWIJ'llDteed a buyer for cattle
d. Controlled marketing weight and cost of gain
e. Reduced profit variation
f. Marketed cattle at higher prices
g. Other
4. What advantages were there for packers who entered into marketing/purchasing agreements?
(Rank the three most important factors, where 1= most important, 2=secood most important,
and 3 = third most important.)
Rank
a. Reduced price variability
b. Reduced basi.s variability
c. Guaranteed a given quantity of cattle
d. Increased leverage in the cash market
e. Controlled timing of deliveries
f. Reduced profit variation
g. Reduced quantity variation
h. Purchased cattle at lower prices
1. Other
Part C. Cash Market Procurement
5. In your opinion, which of the following statements are correct? Note: Captive supplies refer
both to forward contracts and marketing/purchasing agreements.
Captive supplies ...
a. Benefit the packers who use them
b. Benefit the packers who do not use them
c. Benefit the feeders who use them
d. Benefit the feeders who do not use them
e. Reduce market information
f. lncrease market information
g. Reduce price or basis variability on the average
h. Increase price or basis variability on the average
). Result in lower cash market prices on the average
J. Result in higher cash market prices on the average
k. Benefit packers more than feeders
I. Benefit feeders more than packers.
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Part D. MarketingfPurcbasing Agreements: Non-Participants of Either Agreement
6. Check the response which most accurately completes the statement.
When the marketing agreement began, I (our team) ...
a. Noticed that our sale/purchase prices
Increased Decreased Remained the same
b. Noticed that variation in our prices
Increased Decreased Remained the same
c Noticed that competition for cattle
Increased Decreased Remained the same
d. Noticed that our trading with different packers/feeders
In.creased Decreased Remained the same
e. Noticed that the amount of reported price information
Increased Decreased Remained the same
f. Noticed that the variation in trading volume
Increased Decreased Remained the same
g. Noticed that our extent of forward contracting
Increased Decreased Remained the same
h. Noticed that our profitlhead
Increased Decreased Remained the same
7. Who benefitted most from the marketing/purchasing agreement?
Packers Feeders _
8. If you had the choice, would you enter into a marketing/purchasing agreement?
Yes No _
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Part E. Marketing/Purchasing Agreements: Participants in Either Agreement
9. Check the response which most accurately completes the statement.
When the marketing agreement began, I (our team) ...
a. Noticed that our sale/purchase prices
Increased _ Decreased _ Remained the same
b. Noticed that variation in our prices
Increased Decreased Remained the same
c. Noticed that competition for cattle
Increased Decreased Remained the same
d. Noticed that variation in our profitlhead
Increased Decreased Remained the same
e. Noticed that our profitlhead
Increased Decreased Remained the same
f. Noticed that the amount of reported price information
Increased Decreased Remained the same
g. Noticed that the extent of forward contracting by other teams
Increased Decreased Remained the same
10. Who benefitted most from the marketing/purcbasing agreement?
Packers Feeders
11. If you had the choice, would you enter into another marketing/purchasing agr~ment?
Yes No
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APPENDIX E: ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Transaction Price Level Models
8 4 2 2
L(J.6!JFDLlijl + L(J.7jDPKRijl + "I (J.g!JMPA ijl + "ICJ. 9jDRNR;jl
j=1 j=l j=l j=1
2 2
+ L CJ. IO!JMAPijl + L CJ. lIjJNMPijl + Vit
j=l j=J
8
Al-2: TPFCt = CJ.o + CJ.1BBPt-1 + (J.2TU-1 + CJ.37SLI-l + CJ.~PI.J( + "ICJ. 5jDFDLT;jt
j=1
4 2 2 2
+ "ICJ.6jDPKRijl + "ICJ.7jDMPAijt + "ICJ.gjJRNR;jt + "ICJ. 9jDMAl\1
j=1 j=1 ~1 j=1
2
+ "I CJ. IOjDNA1Pijt + Vit
j=1
8 4 2 2
LCJ.5jDFDLTijt + LCJ.6jDPKRijl + LCJ. 7jDMPA;jt + LCJ.s/JRNRijL
j= I j= I j= I oF I
2 2
+ LCJ.9jJMAPijt + 'LCJ.lQjDNM1\t + Vil
j=l j=1
8 4 2 2
'LCJ.5!JrJJLTijl + 'LCJ. 6jDPKRijl + LCJ.7jDMPAijt + 'LCJ.SjDRNR;jl
j=1 j=l j=1 j=J
2 2
+ "ICJ.9jJMAPijt + LCJ.l0jDNMPijt + ViI
j=1 j=1
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8 4
A2-2: TPFCil = a.o + o.tBBPt•l + a2TM...l + o.3TSL t_1 + L o.4JFDLTijl + L aspPKRjjt
j=J j=l
2 2 2 2
+ La.6/JMPA jjl + L o. 7PRNRiji + Lo.sPMAPij\ + Lo.<jjlJNMP;jt
j=1 j=l j=l j=1
8
A2-3: TPFCt = a.o + o.lLCFMPt_] + o.2'IMt-l + o.3T5L\_1 + L o. 4PFDLT;j\ +
j=1
4 2 2 2
'Lo.spPKRijl + 'L o. 6PMPA ij\ + 'L o.7PRNRijt + Lo.sPA-fAPijl
j=l j=1 j=1 j=1
2
+ L o. 9jJNMPijt + ViI
j-= I
8
A3-I: TPFC\ = 0.0 + alBBPt_l + a2LCFMPt_1+ a3T5L\_1 + L a 4PFDLT;jt +
j=1
4 2 2 2
Lo.sPPKRijt + L a 6PMPA ijt + 'L a 7PRNRijl + LasPMAPijl
j=l j=! j=1 j=1
2
+ L a9pNMPjjl + Vit
j=l
8 4
A3-2: T?FCt = 0.0 + aIBB?t_, + a2 T5L l_j + La 3jDFDLTijt + 'L a 4jDPKR;jl +
j=l j=l
2 2 2 2
LasPMPAijt + 'L a 6jJRNRijl + La.7PMAPijt + LayjDNMP;jt
j=l j=1 j=l j=l
+V;t
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8 4
A3-3: TPfC;t = ao + UILCFMPI_1 + u2TSLI-J + L u3j)FDLTiji + L U4j)PKRijt +
FI Fl
2 2 2 2
LUsj)MPAijt + L U6j)RNRijt + LU7j)MAPijt + LUsj)NMPijt
j=l Fl j=1 FI
+ Vit
8 4
A4-l: TPFC;t = ao + uIBBPt_} + U2LCFMPt_1 + 'Lu3jJFDLT;jl + 'L U4j)PKR;jt
j=l j=1
2 2 2 2
+ 'L u 5j)MPAijt + 'L u 6PRNRijt + L U7PMAPiji + LUsPNMPijl
j=l j= I j=l j=1
+Vit
8 4 2
A4-2: TPFCI = ao + uIBBPt-} + LU2PFDLJ;jl + 'LU3PPKRijl + LU4PMPAijt +
j~l j=1 Fl
2 2 2
'LUsPRNRijl + 'L u 6PMAP;jl + 'L u 7!JNMP;jl +Vil
j=1 j=1 j=l
8 4 2
A4-3: TPFCl = a.o + uILCFMPt_] + 'Lu2j)FDLT;jt + 'LuJ}JPKRijl + 'Lu4jDMPAijl
j= I j= I j= I
2 2 2
+ 'L U5PRNR;jt + 'LU6/JMAPijt + 'L U7/JNMPijt + Vii
j=l j=1 j= I
Weekly Transaction Price Level Models
2 2
'L u 6PMPAjt + 'L u 7jDRNRjl + ~
j=l j=l
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p:z
2
Cl-2: AVGPRC = a.o + o.lBBPt_1+ o.2TM,,-1 + o.3TSLt_1+ aJJPLt + 'La~j)MPAjt
j=J
2
+ L o.6j)RNRjt + ~
j=1
2
Cl-3: AVGPRC = a.o + o.1LCFMPt_1+ o.2JMt-l + a3TSLt-l + aJ>PLt + 'Lo.sj)MPAjt +
j=1
2
L o. 6jJRNRjt + ~
j=1
2
C2-1: AVGPRC = a.o + a1BBPt-1+ a2LCFMPt_1 + o.3TM,,-1 + U4TSLt-1+ Lasj)MPAjl
j=1
2
+ La6jDRNRjt + ~
j=J
2
C2-2: AVGPRC = 0.0 + CJ.1BBPt-1+ o.2'IMt-l + CJ.3TSLt_J + Lo.4j)MPAjt +
j=1
2
L o.sj)RNRjt + ~
j: 1
2
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2
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j=J
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j=1 j=1
2 2
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Abstract
Changing marketing and procurement strategies in the fed cattle market over the
last decade have involved marketing finished cattle through three alternative marketing
methods. This study uses experimental simulation to examine transaction price level
and variability differences between alternative marketing methods. Alternative
methods consist of marketing or purchasing finished cattle through: (1) the cash bid
and offer system, (2) cash forward contract arrangements, and (3) exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements. Two sets of econometric models are specified and
estimated to determine: (1) transaction price level and variance differences between
each method and (2) transaction price level and variance differences between each
method that are realized by individual firms. Results indicate that the exclusive
marketing/procurement agreement method resulted in significantly lower mean price
levels and significantly lower price variances than the cash marketing method. No
significant price level differences were found between the cash marketing method and
the cash forward contracting method. However, results suggest that the cash forward
contracting marketing method had a significantly lower price variance than the cash
marketing method. Significant positive and negative price level differences indicate
that some of the individual firms observed price level differences while utilizing
alternative marketing methods.
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-MARKETING METHOD PRICE DIFFERENCES IN THE FED CATILE
MARKET: AN EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION APPROACH
Introduction
Problem
Price discovery research has examined the price discovery process by focusing
on transactions made between the buyers and sellers in specified markets. These
transactions often occur through different pricing arrangements (Farris). Tomek and
Robinson note that pricing arrangements and pricing mechanisms are used
interchangeably to denote the complex set of institutions and pricing methods that are
used to price agricultural products. The pricing arrangements by which transactions
occur in the fed cattle market have become a focal point for price discovery research
over the last decade. These pricing arrangements are referred to as alternative
marketing methods in recent fed cattle price discovery research (Ward et al. 1996a).
The fed cattle market has evolved to include the negotiation of prices between
meatpacking and feedlot firms for finished cattle using several different transaction or
marketing methods.
Immense structural changes during the past ten to fifteen years in the livestock
slaughtering industry have raised questions concerning the volatility of transaction
prices in US beef, pork, and poultry markets. Meatpacking and feedlot firms have
increased consolidation efforts and many of these large consolidated firms are utilizing
alternative marketing methods that are unique to the cash bid and offer system or
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pricing mechanism. Schroeder et al. described two alternative marketing methods that
were identified as cash forward contracting and exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements or formula based pricing arrangements.
Cash forward contracting involves cattle feeding firms agreeing to market
finished cattle to beefpacking firms at an agreed upon price. Finished cattle are to be
delivered to the packing facility at a designated point in the future. The time period
between the point of sale and delivery is generally more than two weeks and can
conceivably be two to four months (Ward et at. 1996a).
Exclusive marketing/procurement agreements involve written or verbal contracts
held by one meatpacking firm and one or more feedlot firms which allow the
participating firms to engage in formula based pricing strategies in relation to the sale
and/or purchase of finished cattle. The formula based pricing strategies commonly
employed in this type of marketing method often involve sharing available profits or
losses during a given market period. Existing agreements have been structured so that
additional firms cannot be included in the agreement and so that the details of the
agreement are not made public.
Industry concerns range from the actual impact that these exclusive agreements
and forward contracting arrangements have on cash market prices to how they affect
the availability of market information. The analysis of these developments requires the
evaluation of raw data collected from private firms that exist in today's fed cattle
market. These firms rarely release data concerning their operations. Hence, collecting
data from the relevant firms has become increasingly difficult as a direct result of the
113
_______________________0
-consolidation and complex marketing method alternatives that have evolved within the
industry. Farris notes that if two or more pricing mechanisms or marketing methods
simultaneously occur for a given commodity, then it is possible to make comparisons.
However, it is impossible to hold other things constant in a non-experimental setting or
data collection period (Farris).
A Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) was developed and has been updated in
order to realistically simulate the current fed cattle market (Ward et al. 1996b; Koontz
et al. 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). This simulated market is a market where
the alternative marketing methods described above can be utilized. Hence, research
involving the evaluation of price differences between alternative marketing methods
used by firms in the fed cattle market can be conducted using data collected from
simulated trading periods within the FCMS.
Significance
Previous research has examined the impacts of forward contracting on fed cattle
transaction prices (Schroeder et al.; Barkley and Schroeder; Ward et al. 1996a). One
previous study has evaluated price differences between cash and forward contract prices
considering the entire fed cattle market as well as price differences observed by each
firm within the market relative to one other fi.rm (Ward 1996b). This study evaluates
price level and variability differences between three specific marketing methods that are
observed in today's fed cattle market. This study differs from previous research by
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-focusing on the evaluation of price level and variability differences between each
marketing method. Additionally, this study examines price level and variability
differences between each marketing method experienced by individual firms. Each of
these methods have been previously mentioned and they are described in relation to
marketing or purchasing finished cattle based on cash transactions (Marketing Method
1), cash forward contracting (Marketing Method 2), and exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements (Marketing Method 3).
Research Objectives
This study has one general objective and four specific objectives. The general
objective is to determine the significance of price differences between alternative
marketing methods used by feedlot and meatpacking firms in the fed cattle market.
Specific objectives are: (1) to determine the extent of price level differences between
specific marketing methods, (2) to determine whether specific marketing methods
significantly affect the variability of market transaction prices, (3) to determine the
extent of price level differences between specific marketing methods experienced by
individual firms, and (4) to determine whether specific marketing methods significantly
affect the price variability experienced by individual firms.
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-Contribution To Knowledge
Previous fed cattle price discovery research has examined differences in fed
cattle transaction prices. Ward 1992 examined the differences in fed cattle prices
among buyers and buyer groups following the mergers of the meatpacking firms in the
late 1980's. The study used primary and secondary data from 173 commercial feedlot
managers in the southern plains region. This region included 17 counties in southwest
Kansas, 5 counties in southeast Colorado, 3 counties in the Oklahoma panhandle, and
36 counties in the Texas panhandle. The participating feedlot managers recorded data
daily for each fed cattle sale lot marketed during June 1989. A total of 21. 9% of the
managers responded. The data requested included all aspects of any activity and all
aspects of the cattle that were sold.
Ward 1992 then specified four cross-section and time series models to explain
the variation in transaction prices for fed cattle. The theoretical development of the
models was based on the pricing process that packers follow in determining bid prices
for fed cattle and prior research using transaction price models. Ordinary Least
Squares was used to estimate the models. The author found that buyer activity was
highest on Monday, that there is a significant relationship between the transaction price
and the number of days between purchase and delivery, that there were significant price
differences among individual buyers and buyer groups, and that significantly lower
prices were paid by the Big Three firms than those paid by other firms. He also found
that the average prices paid by individual buyers and buyer groups differed within
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subregions as well as within the southern plains region. Here, he pointed out that
although the Big Three firms paid lower prices than other meatpacking firms
considered, there was a significant difference in the prices paid within the Big Three
group itself. He concluded by noting that subregion models reveal inter-firm price
differences that regional models are unable to capture.
Ward and Bliss evaluated the extent of forward contracting in 1988 and assessed
cattle feeders' perceptions of benefits to themselves and to packers, perceptions of
potential pricing implications, and opinions regarding,any proposed regulatory policies
of the future. Data were collected through a questionnaire mailed to 3700 cattle
feeders in the spring of 1989. These cattle feeders were from the 13 major cattle
feeding states which included Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. A
total of 503 questionnaires were properly returned which reported the marketing of 6.1
million fed cattle in 1988 or about 26 % of the total fed cattle marketing for 1988.
Over 75 percent of the cattle marketed were from survey respondents representing
feedlots that marketed 20,000 or more fed cattle.
The authors found that 754.6 thousand cattle were reported to be forward
contracted in 1988 by the survey respondents. This total represented about 12.7
percent of the total fed cattle marketings reported by the respondents in 1988. Most of
the contracting was found to be in Kansas and Texas which accounted for 63.4 percent
of the total forward contracted cattle. The authors noted that the percentage of
contracts was no higher among the larger feedlots than among the smaller feedlots.
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-They also found that, based on respondent estimates, the growth in future contacting
during 1990 was projected to be around 2 percent above the 1988 reported contracting
level. They also noted that forward contracting for fed cattle during 1990 was
estimated to be about 15 percent of total marketings in the 13 cattle feeding states.
Ward and Bliss also evaluated questions concerning the type of contract and the
characteristics of different contracts. They found that over two-thirds of the contracts
were basis contracts and the remaining were flat price contracts. They also found that
the number and percentage of contracted cattle was highest in April. Accordingly,
27.7 percent of the respondents reported forward contracting cattle more than 3 months
prior to delivery. They note that the feeding firms forward contracting cattle 3 months
or longer prior to delivery were likely marketing cattle by contract shortly after placing
the cattle on feed. They also found that Excel was the most common buyer of
contracted cattle among the respondents and that there were no other packers that were
significant contracting parties other than the Big Three (IBP, ConAgra, and Excel).
Ward and Bliss also evaluated several statements within the questionnaire
regarding the potential benefits of forward contracting cattle between cattle feeders and
meatpackers. They found that the primary benefit to feeders, according to the
respondents, from contracting cattle was that it enhanced their debt financing
arrangements. On the other hand, they found that the primary benefit to packers
perceived by cattle feeders from forward contracting was that it allowed them the
ability to secure a given quantity of cattle for slaughter.
The last area of questions evaluated by Ward and Bliss from the questionnaire
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-focused on the impacts of forward contracting on transaction prices, the impacts of
forward contracting on competition, and the suggested industry and government
policies concerning the contracting of cattle. In regards to the impacts on prices, Ward
and Bliss explain that forward contracts are found to change short-run supply and
demand conditions for packers which alters their procurement and pricing strategies.
As a result, this could cause prices to become uncertain for those packers who have no
forward contracted cattle. They also found that the respondents to the questionnaire
thought that forward contracting was not necessarily good for competition or the
industry by evaluating their responses to several statements regarding how forward
contracts affect different aspects of the fed cattle market. Lastly, they found that the
most acceptable policy alternative among the respondents involved having the industry
monitor the forward contracting of cattle in the fed cattle market. Conversely, the least
acceptable policy alternative among the respondents involved government monitoring
and government imposed limits on forward contracting.
Schroeder et al. evaluated the implications of captive supplies on several aspects
of the fed cattle market. The authors specifically focused on how vertical integration
within the fed cattle market has affected cattle prices, how vertical integration within
the fed cattle market has impacted the market itself, the determinants of fed cattle
transaction prices and their relationship to captive supplies, and the impacts of forward
contracting on value based marketing strategies in the fed cattle market. They began
by explaining captive supplies and noting that captive supplies may take any of three
forms. The first form of captive supplies is packer fed cattle in either packer-owned
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-facilities or in custom feeding operations. The second form of captive supplies is cattle
procured using forward contracts. The third form of captive supplies are cattle
procured through exclusive marketing/procurement agreements (Schroeder et al.). The
authors then reveal specific details concerning each of these forms of captive supplies
and the most common form. They note that many figures reported by USDA indicate
that the use of captive supplies are growing and they suggest that both packers and
feeders benefit from using captive supplies.
Schroeder et al. also explains the findings of a forward contracting study where
an informal survey of seven feedlot managers was conducted in March of 1992 to
obtain information on the mechanics of forward contracting and contract specifications.
All of the managers surveyed by the authors in this study operated in either Kansas or
Colorado. First, the authors found that packers were more willing to waive contract
specifications in the summer rather than during the winter. They noted that most
managers indicated that if the packers were willing to waive one specification, then
they were usually willing to waive all of the contract specifications except carcass
weight. However, if they did not waive specifications, then the feedlot managers could
expect the packers to stringently follow the price adjustment schedules within a given
contract. The authors then evaluated questions concerning which entity was expected
to exert the most control in waiving contract specifications. Here, they found that the
respondents were evenly divided about whether feeders or packers had more control.
Lastly, Schroeder et aI. evaluated slaughter and delivery date questions within the
survey. In most cases, the respondents thought it was better to allow the packer to
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-have scheduling flexibility so that each meatpacking finn could exert more control over
contract specifications.
Schroeder et al. then examined the theoretical impacts that captive supplies have
on prices in short run and long-run time periods. The authors explain that the major
aspect of captive supplies in the long-run is that packers are able to secure cattle
purchases well in advance of slaughter. Also, cattle feeders are able to secure a price
and a buyer long before the cattle are ready for market. Therefore, both packers and
feeders benefit from additional marketing flexibility and reduced market uncertainty
from the existence of forward contracts or other captive supply strategies (Schroeder et
al.). The authors suggest that in the long-run the average contracted price should be
less than the average cash market price for fed cattle. Therefore, cattle feeders were
willing to accept a lower price in return for reductions in the selling costs and other
costs associated with price variability (Schroeder et aI.). The authors then explain that
in the short-run packers increase their ability to control slaughter schedules which
increases the level of competition between beefpackers. They note that there are no
observed increases in flexibility realized by cattle feeders in the short-run time period.
However, they note that the relationship can only be precisely determined by evaluating
results produced by empirical research.
The authors then review and compare several previous empirical studies that
examine the impacts of captive supplies on fed cattle prices and proceeded to develop
their own empirical study to investigate the short-run fed cattle price impacts from
captive supplies. To do so, they specified a fed cattle transaction price model that
121
sd
--
included explanatory variables that encompassed the demand for cattle characteristics
and the number of cattle supplied to a regional market. They also included two
separate sets of variables to determine how the level of captive supplies impact prices
paid for fed cattle. Data used in the model were collected from individual transactions
representing 1407 pens of cattle or 166,338 head from May 21, 1990 through
November 24, 1990. Each transaction came from one of 13 feedyards in southwestern
Kansas. All of the cattle quality variables (such as age, weight, sex, etc.) were found
to have a positive impact on prices with the exception of two (Schroeder et al.). The
coefficients measuring the price impacts that resulted from market factors (such as
boxed beef prices, futures market prices, geographic region, etc.) were both positive
and negative each being consistent with economic theory.
The variables explaining the impacts on prices resulting from captive supplies
had a statistically significant negative influence on fed cattle prices. Over the period
studied, captive supplies as a whole were found to reduce prices by $0. 15/cwt. to
$0.31/cwt. depending upon whether the measurement was by individual firms or by the
aggregate of captive supplies in the market. The authors were careful to note that the
estimates should not be interpreted as being valid for captive supply levels outside of
the bounds of the data set. Schroeder et al. then discussed the limitations of the study
and concluded by suggesting that their research shows that captive supplies have a
negative impact on the price of fed cattle within the geographic market that they
studied. However, they clearly point out that due to the extensive limitations from
their data, policy recommendations in regard to captive supplies are uncertain at best.
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Hayenga and O'Brien analyzed three important issues that have developed
within the fed cattle market in recent years. These issues were the effect that a
reduction in the number of buyers in a specified market area has on prices received by
producers, the effect that captive supplies have on the level and variability of prices
paid to livestock producers, and the relevant geographic market for fed cattle research
that determines the impacts of consolidation and captive supplies on the prices of fed
cattle. The authors noted that answers to the questions presented by these issues will be
needed as policy makers reflect on the deregulation period of the 1980's and attempt to
decide whether or not corrective action is needed.
To analyze these related issues Hayenga and O'Brien collected USDA Choice
steer prices for 1100-1300 lb. animals from several different geographic markets. In
addition, Cattle-Fax estimates of weekly forward contract cattle deliveries to packers
from 4 states, USDA statistics on weekly state cattle slaughter, and USDA-FSIS
statistics on the number of beef slaughter plants above 100,000 head of capacity in each
state were collected. The period for which the data were collected ranged from 1988 to
1989 except for the USDA-FSIS statistics on the number of slaughter plants that
operated above 100,000 head of capacity which covered the period 1973-1989. The
states that were considered in this study are Colorado, Kansas, Texas, Nebraska, and
Iowa. The authors noted that of these five states, Colorado had the greatest
proportional decrease in both the number of large beefpacking plants and the number of
owners of large plants. As a result, the authors indicated that Colorado was the state
that presented the highest degree of concentration when compared to the other states
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-under consideration. Initially, the authors estimated the impacts of changes in the
number of sellers and buyers through a series of quadratic models for the purpose of
accommodating possible nonlinear relationships. They found that, in general, changes
in the relative number of plant owners had no significant impact on prices among states
in question. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis was then carried out to
examine the impact of structural changes on relative beef prices. This method was
chosen to determine how changes in the supply of beef, changes in income, and
changes in population impact fed cattle transaction prices. The authors found that the
effects from per capita beef consumption were negative and significant at the I % level
of significance. They also found that disposable income had a small, positive, and
significant effect on fed cattle prices.
Hayenga and O'Brien also measured the effect of captive supplies in the form of
forward contracting by transforming the forward contract delivery estimates into
percentages of state weekly slaughter values for Colorado, Texas, Nebraska, and
Kansas. The authors computed correlation statistics between each state for weekly
contract volumes which were found to be generally low. Here, the authors suggested
that contract volumes had no statistically significant effects on price levels. The SUR
analysis was used to estimate the effects of forward contracting on fed cattle prices for
each state considering prices reported during the period October 1988 through
December 1989. They found that forward contract deliveries in Kansas during the
current week had a significant negative effect on Kansas fed cattle prices. Forward
contract deliveries in other states were found to have no significant effects on fed cattle
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-prices these states. Therefore, the authors suggested that their results indicate there is
not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that high levels of captive supplies
bring significant negative pressure on fed cattle prices.
Next, the authors examined the problem of determining the correct geographic
market area for fed cattle. In doing so, they detailed the characteristics of the market
and the procurement areas that surround individual meatpacking firms. They note that
the area in which the price reverberations from shocks to the system are quickly felt are
the best candidates for the relevant geographic market. In relation, the authors point
out that the speed and strength of geographic market price arbitrage is a good indicator
of the relevant geographic market scope. Hayenga and O'Brien used econometric and
vector autoregression techniques to analyze the speed and strength of geographic
market price interactions among several states. The authors also used the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test to determine whether daily and lagged fed cattle prices within eight
different states were cointegrated. The authors point out that cointegration allowed
them to determine the degree to which the fed cattle marketing regions are linked or
spatially re.lated. The authors found that the price behaviora.l results for primary cattle
feeding states considered indicated that a significant amount of integration does exist
among geographic markets. The speed and strength of price reactions analysis
produced results that suggested that a single state is too small to be considered a
relevant procurement market for fed cattle. Furthermore, the results indicated that the
relevant market is larger than the procurement area for a particular firm because other
firms can buy at the fringe of the procurement area and send lagged price responses
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-across a broad geographic area (Hayenga and O'Brien). The authors conclude by
revealing that stronger lagged price linkages might deserve a more in-depth analysis in
order to determine the relevant market area in antitrust cases or for research projects
involving structural analysis.
Barkley and Schroeder used a theoretical model to determine how changes in
market conditions and industrial structure affects fed cattle prices in both spot and
forward markets. They indicated that forward contacting offers an element of certainty
to an uncertain market environment which is considered to be the main advantage for
both feeders and packers to engage in forward contracting. Barkley and Schroeder
suggest that a form of risk-mitigation is offered by this fact which is an incentive for
feedlot managers to offer and/or accept forward contracts. They note that this idea
provides a foundation for theoretical models developed to estimate price impacts due to
forward contracting.
Barkley and Schroeder proceeded to develop the theoretical model by specifying
the feedlots objective function or profit maximization equation. The specific
assumptions in relation to price variability were then incorporated into the profit
function. Through differentiation of the adjusted equation, the authors derived the
supply of forward contracts equation and the supply of cattle to the cash market
equation. From these supply equations, the firm demand for forward contracts
equation and the firm demand for spot cattle equation was derived and exp1ained. The
authors note that due to limited data on the quantity and price of contracted cattle, the
motivation for packers to purchase cattle in forward markets requires further
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-investigation through future empirical research. Barkley and Schroeder note that the
most commonly accepted motivation for packers is that forward contracts allow them to
purchase cattle to meet plant capacity requirements from the source offering the lowest
procurement costs. The authors proceed to equate the supply and demand equations in
both the spot and forward markets to yield equilibrium prices for each market. Here,
the authors develop comparative static equations that are capable of revealing price
impacts from a shock to each of the exogenous variables which involve the variability
of the spot market price, changes in the demand for fed cattle, and changes in feedlot
capacity.
Barkley and Schroeder suggest that an important outcome of the model
development process is that contract prices of cattle must be lower than the expected
value of the spot market price. This theoretical finding is consistent with previous
research considering the effects of forward contracting on price. Also, the model
reveals incentives for both packers and feedlot firms to buy and sell cattle through
forward contracts. The authors note that their fed cattle contracting model explicitly
expresses the effects of forward contracts on prices in the fed cattle market. In general,
the authors note that their model indicates that greater variability in spot market
transaction prices result from an increased demand for forward contracts which
increases contract prices relative to spot market prices. The authors conclude by
suggesting that as more evidence accumulates on the motivation of packers to enter
forward contracts, specific hypotheses generated from their theoretical model could be
used in empirical research to provide further informational insights about the impacts of
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forward contracts on fed cattle transaction prices.
Previous research has also evaluated alternative marketing methods other than
those that relate specifically to pricing arrangements. Fausti and Feuz note that when
cattle producers sell finished cattle to meatpacking firms, they choose to market cattle
based on one of three alternatives. These alternatives are (1) dressed weight and grade,
(2) dressed weight, and (3) live weight. Each of these methods are referred to by the
authors as marketing alternatives.
After developing theoretical models explaining price disparity in the fed cattle
market, Fausti and Feuz collected data on 218 pens of finished steers from the South
Dakota Retained Ownership Demonstration Project over a three year period that started
in April of 1991. Each pen of cattle was marketed based on the dressed weight and
grade marketing alternative. The authors also collected market price data for the live
and dressed markets in the same market area. From this data, the authors were able to
consider the mean price differences between each of the three marketing alternatives.
The authors concluded from their study that significant price differences exist
between the dressed weight and grade alternative compared to the live alternative.
Specifically, their results suggest that higher mean prices are paid for the dressed
weight and grade alternative. Fausti and Feuz also evaluated price difference between
the dressed weight and live marketing alternatives. The authors concluded that
meatpacking firms pay significantly higher prices for cattle that are marketed by the
dressed weight alternative. The authors suggest that price differences between the
specified marketing alternatives support the theory of factor price disparity.
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Feuz et al. 1993 evaluated the pricing efficiency of alternative marketing
methods for slaughter cattle. The authors note that producers who produce lean
consistent carcasses do not receive price premiums and those who produce less
desirable carcasses may not receive price discounts under the most commonly used
marketing method. The mean profit levels, degree of price differentiation, and carcass
quality variables that have the most significant impact on profit are compared for all
four methods. The four marketing methods considered by Feuz et al. 1993 include
marketing .finished cattle through: (1) a live weight basis, (2) a dressed weight basis,
(3) a dressed weight and grade basis, and (4) a value based marketing approach known
as the Excel Muscle Scoring System.
Feuz et al. 1993 used 69 groups of 5 steer calves that represented 53 different
producers as part of the South Dakota State University Retained Ownership
Demonstration Project in October of 1990. The authors used the data to develop the
appropriate hypothesis tests considering the impacts of increased information about
product quality on producer profit variances. Feuz et al. 1993 also estimated profit
models for producer profits under each of the four marketing methods.
The authors found that statistically significant mean profit differences do exist
between the four alternative marketing methods considered. They suggest profits are
lower when cattle are marketed on a live weight basis that under any other marketing
method considered. Results indicated that the dressed weight marketing method was
the most profitable but not significantly different from the dressed weight and grade
marketing method. Regression results from the profit models allowed the authors to
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-conclude that feedlot production variables are more significant in explaining profit
variation under the live weight marketing method. Feuz et aI. 1993 notes that only
when steers are marketed on a grade and yield or value based marketing basis do
carcass characteristics become as important to profit as the feedlot production variables.
The authors conclude by suggesting that the live and dressed weight methods do not
effectively communicate the desires of consumers to the cattle producer through profits.
Feuz et al. 1995 evaluated the risk premiums associated with three cash
marketing methods for U.S. slaughter cattle producers. The marketing methods
considered by the authors include marketing finished cattle through: (1) a live weight
basis, (2) a dressed weight basis, and (3) a dressed weight and grade basis. Feuz et aI.
1995 classified cattle producers according to Pratt-Arrow risk-aversion coefficients into
three categories which include: risk averse, risk neutral, and risk preferring. The
authors used producer profits and the mentioned risk aversion categories to determine
the effect of uncertainty associated with incomplete information across alternative
marketing methods on the market price for slaughter cattle and on buyer and seller
behavior.
Feuz et aI. 1995 collected data from 69 pens of steer caIves in 1991 and 84 pens
of steer calves in 1992 as part of a retained ownership demonstration project. The
steers represented more that 100 different operations and three different states. The
authors used the data to calculate theoretical revenue equations under each of the
marketing methods considered. From this the authors developed risk premium
equations, solved for the absolute risk-aversion coefficients associated with marketing
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-cattle under each of the marketing methods, and tested the appropriate risk premium
hypothesis.
From results of the hypothesis tests and risk-aversion coefficient analysis, the
authors drew several conclusions about incomplete information impacts across
marketing methods. Feuz et al. 1995 found that cattle buyers charge risk premiums for
cattle that are marketed through the live and dressed weight marketing methods. Feuz
et al. 1995 also note that empirical evidence indicates that risk premiums increase as
the risk to buyers increase. Results from the risk-aversion coefficient analysis allowed
the authors to suggest that the level of risk did not affect the level of risk aversion, but
it did affect the magnitude of the risk premium charged by fed cattle buyers. Feuz et
al. 1995 concluded by suggesting that the risk to sellers is the variability of returns
which increases when fed cattle producers change marketing strategies from selling
cattle on a live weight basis to a dressed weight basis to the dressed weight and grade
basis. Hence, the live weight basis creates the lowest expected revenue and the grade
and yield basis creates the highest expected revenue of the marketing methods
considered.
Previous research has also considered price differences between marketing
methods used for market livestock other than finished cattle. Ward and Hildebrand
considered price differences between four alternative marketing methods for 828 sale
lots of slaughter lambs during 1991. The marketing methods considered by their study
consisted of marketing slaughter lambs through: (1) auction markets, (2) electronic
markets, (3) direct marketing, and (4) pooled markets.
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-Ward and Hildebrand developed and estimated two slaughter lamb transaction
price level models. The authors found that significant price differences exist between
alternative marketing methods used by producers of slaughter lambs. OLS results
indicated that slaughter lamb prices were significantly higher for lambs marketed
through the electronic market than lamb prices marketed in the auction market method.
Estimated results also indicated that slaughter lamb prices for lambs marketed by the
direct marketing method were significantly higher than lamb prices in the auction
market method.
Procedure
Methods
The methods used for this project consisted of six linear regression models that
were estimated to test six statistical hypotheses. The statistical hypotheses considered
in this study are presented in Table 1. The linear regression models focus on
determining the extent to which price level and variation differences exist between
alternative marketing methods. These models were estimated for the entire simulated
fed cattle market period to consider the level and the variation in fed cattle transaction
prices due to alternative marketing methods and other vari.ables which influence market
transaction prices.
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-Transaction Price Level Models
A combination of three econometric models were used to examine the
transaction price level questions that are implied in the specific objectives for this
study. The first econometric model is a transaction price level model (Model A) which
was developed to explain how the specified marketing methods affect fed cattle
transaction price levels within the fed cattle market. The initial transaction price level
model (Model A) is specified and was estimated as follows:
8 4 S
'LP 6j DFDLTijl + 'LfJ7jDPKRjjt + 'LP 8j DWIij l +
j=] j=1 j=l
3
'L fJ 9PMETHijl + Vii
J=l
where, t = time in simulated weeks = 40, 42, 43, ... , 114; i = observations within a
week = 1, 2, 3, ... , Nt ; it = each transaction = I, 2, 3, ... , 2770. The pooled cross-
section time series model was estimated for unbalanced panel data because the number
of transactions observed each week was not equal over the 75 week experimental
period. The definition of each variable and the expected sign for each coefficient is
presented in Table 2.
The second econometric model is a variation of Model A which was developed
to determine how the specified marketing methods affect fed cattle transaction price
levels for each feedlot firm within the simulated fed cattle market. The feedlot-method
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transaction price level model (Model B) is specified and was estimated as follows:
8 4 5 3
'LP 6j DFDL1;j, + 'LP7jDPKRjjt + 'LPsjDWTijt + 'LP9PFINTl jjl
j= \ j= 1 j= I )= I
3 3 3
+ 'L f3 lOPFINl2jjt + 'L /3 I1PFINT3jjt + 'L P 12PFINT4jjl +
j=1 j~l j=1
3 3 3
LfJ J3PFINT5ij, + LP 14PFINT6ijl + Lf315PFI~jl +
j=1 j=\ j=1
3
LfJ 16PFINT8ijl + ViI·
j='l
where, the feedlot-method interaction variables (DFINTl ijl - DFINT8ijJ were substituted
for the marketing method variables (DMETHijJ in model A. The defmition of the
feedlot-method interaction variables are defined in Table 2.
The third econometric model is also a variation of ModeJ A which was
developed to determine how the specified marketing methods effect fed cattle
transaction price levels for each meatpacking firm within the simulated fed cattle
market. The meatpacker-method transaction price level model (Madej C) is specified
and was estimated as follows:
8 4 5 3
'LfJ 6j DFDL1;jt + 'LP7jDPKRjjl + 'LfJsjDWT;jl + 'LfJ9PPINTl ij,
J= I )= l j= 1 j= I
3 3 3
+ 'L fJ IOPPINl2jjl + 'L /3 llPPINT3ijl + 'L /3 12PPINT4ijl + ViI'
]=1 )=1 j=1
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where, the meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTl ijt - DPINT4ijJ were
substituted for the marketing method variables (DMETHjjJ in model A. The definition
of the meatpacker-method interaction variables are defined in Table 2.
It is not statistically plausible to estimate Models A, B, and C as shown in their
respective statistical equations (1, 2, and 3). A variable from each of the following
binary groups must be excluded in the estimation process: DMijt, DFDLTijt, DPKRijt ,
DMETHijtl DFIN1ijt, and DPIN1ijt. The variables that were not included will be
referred to as 'base" variables in subsequent tables and figures. The base variables are
specified in Table 2.
Models A, B, and C are specified as a Weighted Random Effects Models
(WREM) and each was estimated for unbalanced panel data. The WREM model
specification was used in this study to correct for multiplicative heteroskedasticity in
the error term (ViJ resulting from the two experiments that were applied to the
simulated marketing period (Judge et al.). The WREM is an Estimated Generalized
Least Squares (EGLS) regression model that assumes the error term (Vil) contains two
components
(4) Vit = eit + Ut •
The first component is randomness of the transaction prices within each week which is
known as white noise and the second component measures the random impact that is
common to each simulated week of trading (Judge et al.). The component error term
has disturbances (0/ + a}) that are equal to 02 and are assumed to be uncorrelated as
follows:
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(5)
(6)
(7)
and
E[uJ = 0,
2Var[uJ = au ,
(8 V 2 2 2) ar[eil + uJ = a e + au = a .
However, for a given t, the disturbances are assumed to be correlated by virtue of their
common component (p = 0'/10'2) as follows:
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity was found among simulated weeks due to the
randomized reward/non-reward and agreement/non-agreement periods. The random
effects model was weighted (WtsjJ to correct for the multiplicative form of
heteroskedasticity as follows:
Where eit 2 represents the squared error or conditional variance for each observation.
Each model yielded Estimated Generalized Least Squares estimates for the relevant
economic variables using LIMDEP 6.0 software (Greene).
Ward et al. 1996b noted that many of the traditional economic variables of
transaction price models found in previous research are accounted for or held constant
by the FCMS. These variables generally include cattle quality characteristics such as
age, weight, sex, quality grades, yield grades, etc. Reasons for the inclusion of these
types of variables in transaction price models that explain fed cattle prices are well
developed in Jones et al., Schroeder et al., Ward et al. 1996b, Ward 1981, Ward
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1982, and Ward 1992. As a result, variable explanation at this juncture will focus on
those variables that are specific to this study.
The price of boxed beef (BBP) was lagged one week (t-l) because the
meatpacking firms (buying agents) base their procurement decisions on the market
information that has been reported most recently. The price of boxed beef is reported
at the conclusion of each simulated week and represents the price for which boxed beef
is sold in that week. Therefore, the buying agents within the FCMS utilize boxed beef
prices for fed cattle that were purchased in the previous week (i.e., buying agents
purchase cattle in one week and sell beef produced by those cattle the following week).
Lagged boxed beef prices were found in this study to be highly correlated (r=0.813)
with the average price paid for fed cattle in each simulated week. The rationale for
including the previous week's closing futures market price for the nearby live cattle
contract (LCFMPl _1) is much the same as the reason for including lagged boxed beef
prices (BBPt-1). The exception is that both the buying agents and the feedlot firms
(selling agents) formulate marketing/procurement decisions that are based on the
closing nearby live cattle futures market price.
Two different independent variables were used to represent the supply of fed
cattle. The total number of fed cattle on the show list (TSL) for the previous week (t-l)
is known by all firms within the FCMS. The number of cattle on the show list
represents cattle that can be marketed in the current week (i.e., fed cattle that weigh
between 1,100 lbs. and 1,200 lbs.). Previous research has indicated that this number is
important in forecasting prices in the fed cattle market (Ward et al. 1996b; Bacon,
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Trapp, and Koontz). The total number of pens marketed in the previous week (TM1_1)
is another supply variable that has been found to significantly affect prices paid for fed
cattle (Schroeder et al.). These two variables were not found to be highly correlated
with one another (r=0.161). An explanation for this is that the buying agents purchase
fed cattle to fulfill a known low cost or optimal plant capacity during each week of
trading. This causes total marketings (TM1_1) to remain constant relative to the amount
of cattle supplied to the market or on the total show list (TSL1_1) from week to week.
When the buying and selling agents of the FCMS approach one another to agree
upon a bid or ask price, they negotiate or bargain until a final transaction price is
reached. The amount for which they negotiate revolves around how to split or share
the available profits or losses in the market at the time of the trade. In order to do this,
participants of the FCMS must estimate the feedlot and meatpacker break-even prices
for fed cattle in each trading period. The difference between the largest rneatpacker's
break-even price for the 1150 lb. weight class and the feedlots' break-even price for the
same weight class represents the profits or losses (PPLJ that are available to the market
in week t. This amount can be shared by the simulated firms in each trading period.
The available profits or losses (PPLJ in this study were used as a measure of the
bargaining range or the distribution of profits or losses between the buying and selling
agents of the FCMS.
Separate variables were included in the model to explain how each feedlot firm
and each meatpacking firm within the FCMS affects transaction prices. Hence, there
are eight variables which represent the feedlot firms (DFDLTijJ and four variables that
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represent the meatpacking firms (DPKRijJ. Each of these are binary dummy variables
which coincide with one another to represent the simulated firms involved in each
transaction. These variables provide an indication of the overall effects that each firm
has on fed cattle prices.
Ward et al. 1996b notes that a majority of the quality related variables
considered in prior fed cattle price discovery research were accounted for or held
constant by the FCMS. Within the FCMS, quality characteristics for each of the five
weight groups (1100 lbs., 1125 lbs., 1150 lbs., 1175 lbs., and 1200 lbs.) were
different. However, finished cattle quality characteristics were constant within each
weight group. In this study, a set of five binary dummy variables (DWI1 - DWTs)
were included to explain transaction price variation that is due to quality characteristics
of finished cattle much like that which is found in real-world fed cattle transaction price
data. Rationale for the inclusion of quality characteristic variables in fed cattle
transaction price models is thoroughly developed in previous research (Ward et al.
1996a; Ward 1981, 1982, 1992; Jones et al.; Schroeder et al.). The quality
characteristics specific to each of the five weight groups within the FCMS are presented
in Tables 3 and 4.
Previous research has evaluated fed cattle transaction price differences between
specific marketing methods. One previous study used a theoretical model to explain
how expected forward contracting prices will be lower than cash transaction prices
(Barkley and Schroeder). Schroeder et al. found negative price differences between
forward contracts and cash transaction prices for 1,407 pens of fed cattle marketed by
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13 feedlots in southwestern Kansas. Eilrich et aI. estimated price differences between
cash, futures market, and forward contracting prices for 68 pens of fed cattle from
1988 to 1990. The authors found that forward contracting and hedged prices for
finished cattle are significantly less than live weight cash market prices. Ward et aI.
1996a developed and estimated a fed cattle transaction price model that considered
price differences between four procurement methods used by meatpacking firms. The
methods considered by Ward et al. 1996a consist of meatpacking firms purchasing over
139,000 pens of finished cattle through: (1) forward contracting, (2) packer feeding
operations, (3) marketing or purchasing agreements, and (4) cash market transactions.
The authors found that transaction prices associated with forward contracting were
significantly less than prices associated with cash transactions. Furthermore, the
authors found that transaction prices associated with marketing or purchasing
agreements were significantly higher than cash market prices. Ward et al. 1996b
developed and estimated a fed cattle transaction price level model using FCMS data
that considered price differences between cash and forward contracting marketing
methods. The authors found that simulated spot market prices were significantly higher
than forward contract prices.
In this study, binary dummy variables (DMEillijJ were included in model A to
determine price differences between three alternative marketing methods which are:
(l) cash marketing, (2) cash forward contracting, and (3) exclusive
marketing/procurement agreements. The type of marketing method used in each
transaction was specified by the firms involved. Hence, each data record was
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numerically coded for anyone of the three marketing methods considered in this study
by the FCMS data entry system.
Models B and C consider separate dummy variables related to the marketing
method used by each simulated firm throughout the entire marketing period. Ward et
al. 1996b found that significantly different, positive and negative price differences exist
between forward contracting and cash prices observed by each firm. Ward and Bliss
surveyed cattle feeders to determine reasons for the use of forward contracts. The
authors found that cattle feeders use forward contracts for different reasons and that
cattle feeding firms have different expectations about the reasons meatpacking firms
engage in pricing arrangements that involve forward contracts. Model.B of this study
includes twenty-four feedlot-method interaction variables (DFINTl jjl - DFINT8 ijJ.
These variables were substituted for the marketing method variables (DMETHijJ in
model A in order to consider the price differences observed by each of the eight
simulated feedlot firms while utilizing each alternative marketing method. Similarly,
marketing method variables (DMETHijJ of model A are substituted for in model C with
twelve meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTl ijl - DPINT4ij,). The
meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTJ jjt - DPINT4jjJ allow the consideration
of price differences between the three marketing methods observed by each
meatpacking firm of the FCMS.
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Transaction Price Variability Models
Another combined group of three econometric models was used to examine the
transaction price variation questions that are implied in the specific objectives of this
study. The first econometric model is a transaction price variability mod.el (Model D)
which was developed to explain how the specified marketing methods affect the
variance of fed cattle transaction prices. The initial transaction price variability model
(Model D) was specified and estimated as follows:
845
+ L06jDFDL~jt + L07jDPKRjjt + LO"sjDWTjjt +
J=l )=1 j=!
3L 0" 9PME11Jijt + Vit .
J=I
The second transaction price variability model is a variation of Model D which
was developed to determine how the specified marketing methods affect the variation in
fed cattle transaction prices for each feedlot firm within the simulated fed cattle market.
The feedlot-method transaction price variability model (Model E) was specified and
estimated as follows:
8 4 5
+ L°6j DFDL~jl + L 0" 7j DPKR jjt + .L 0" Sj DW1ijt +
j=l j=1 ]=1
3 3 3
L 0 9PFINTl ijt + L OloPFIN12ijl + L OlljDFINT3jjt +
J=I J=I J=I
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L 5 12PFINr4ijt + L 5 13PFINr5ijt + L°J4PFINr6ijt +
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3 3
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where, the feedlot-method interaction variables (DFINTl ijt - DFINr8 jjJ were substituted
for the marketing method variables (DMETHjjJ in model D (Table 2).
The third transaction price variability model is also a variation of Model D
which was developed to determine how the specified marketing methods affect the
variation of fed cattle transaction prices for each meatpacking firm within the simulated
market. The meatpacker-method transaction price variability model (Model F) was
specified and estimated as follows:
8 4 5
+ L06jDFDLTij, + L07jDPKRjjl + LOlljDWTijt +
)=! j=l J=1
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where, the meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTJ ijt - DPINT4ijt) were
substituted for the marketing method variables (DMETHijJ in model D. Definitions of
the meatpacker-method interaction variables can be found in Table 2.
Models D, E, and F were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares for
unbalanced panel data considering traditional assumptions for the Classical Linear
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Regression Model (CLRM). The model was employed by LIMDEP 6.0 econometric
software (Greene). The definition of each variable and the expected sign for each
coefficient is presented in Table 2. All transaction price variability models utilize the
same independent variables and subscript notations that appear in models A, B, and C,
respectively. The dependent variables (VFPFCAit> VFPFCBit , and vrPFCCiJ of the
price variation models (D, E, and F) are represented by the naturallogarithrn of the
squared residuals from models A, B, and C, respectively. The squared residuals serve
as unbiased estimates of the variance about the conditional mean of the dependent
variable (Judge et al.). In this case the squared residuals are estimates of the variance
about the level of transaction prices. A more precise definition of VFPFCAit ,
VFPFCBit , and VFPFCCit can be found in Table 2.
Transaction price variability models D, E, and F yielded OLS estimates of
impacts that the identified variables have on the variability of transaction price levels in
the simulated fed cattle market. A fragility analysis was also considered by using the
squared residuals from an OLS transaction price level model with the same independent
variables as models A, B, and C, respectively. The resulting variance models were
identical in specification and estimation with the exception of specifying OLS squared
residuals as the dependent variable instead of the WREM squared residuals. The
primary reason for this consideration is centered around the fact that the WREM model
most likely does not produce residuals that are consistent estimates of the standard
deviation around the conditional mean. This is due to the fact that the WREM corrects
for multiplicative heteroskedasticity using the Estimated Generalized Least Squares
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technique. However, the results from both types of residual variance models were
similar and the conclusions about price variability differences between each marketing
method derived from both specifications of variance as dependent variables were
identical.
The rationale for including the independent variables of the transaction price
level models (A, H, and C) in the residual variance models are similar to the rationale
for each that has been discussed above (Table 2). The definition of each variable
remains the same but their hypothesized impacts on the variability of transaction prices
may be different. The theoretical reasoning behind using transaction price variables
found in models A, B, and C of this study is that variables explaining levels of
transaction prices are assumed to also explain the variability of transaction prices.
Hence, discussion here is limited to the hypothesized transaction price variability
differences between the alternative marketing methods considered by this study.
There have been numerous studies detailing the overall impacts of captive
supply pricing arrangements or marketing methods on transaction prices, but none have
considered the price variability differences due to these marketing methods. The
marketing method variables (DMETHjjJ used in model A are used in model D to
determine how transaction price variances are different for each of the three different
marketing methods considered. DMETHijl was developed to explain the difference in
transaction price variances between spot market prices, forward contracting prices, and
exclusive marketing/procurement agreement prices.
Model E of this study includes twenty-four feedlot-method interaction variables
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(DFINTl ijl - DFINT8ijJ which were considered by model B. These variables were
substituted for the marketing method variables (DMETHijJ in model D in order to
evaluate the price variability differences that were observed by each of the eight
simulated feedlot firms due to the utilization of each marketing method. Similarly, in
model F marketing method variables (DMETHjjJ of model D were substituted for
twelve meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTl ijl - DPINT4ijJ which were
also discussed relative to transaction price level differences in model C. The
meatpacker-method interaction variables (DPINTl ijt - DPINT4jjJ allow the consideration
of price variability differences between each of the three marketing methods observed
by four individual meatpacking firms of the FCMS.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Model Results
The transaction price level models (A, B, and C) considering price differences
between marketing methods 1, 2, and 3 for the entire simulated market and for each
simulated firm explained over 80 percent of the variation in fed cattle transaction prices
(Table 5). Models A, B, and C were found to be highly significant yielding F-statistics
of 584.55, 484.24, and 509.36, respectively. Models A, B, and C yielded estimates of
the relevant economic variables and accounted for multiplicative heteroskedasticity
within each week and serial correlation throughout the weeks considered by the
experimental trading periods. The random effects in model A, B, and C were found to
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be highly significant in relation to the specification of the statistical model. In general,
this reduced the significance of the independent variables that remained constant within
each week of the experimental trading period. The transaction price variability models
(D, E, and F) exhibited expectedly low explanations of the variation in the conditional
variance estimates (Table 6). However, the models were found to be significant with
F-statistics of 11.80, 11, and 12.20, respectively (Table 6). The estimated results for
each coefficient form models A, B, C, D, E, and F are also presented in Tables 5 and
6.
Summary Statistics
Descriptive statistics were computed to indicate sample differences in
transaction prices arrived at within each marketing method. The statistics take into
account the entire marketing period which experienced both high and low levels of
cattle being supplied to the market, as well as varying levels of cattle being marketed
from week to week. Each of the descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 7.
Initially, it is apparent that the exclusive marketing/procurement method (marketing
method 3) had the lowest mean price by $0.60/cwt. lower than the cash forward
contract method (marketing method 2). Accordingly, cash transactions (marketing
method 1) exhibits the highest mean price, also by more than $1/cwt. over marketing
method 2 and less than $3/cwt. over marketing method 3.
The variance of transaction prices were also different across the three marketing
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methods. Marketing method 1 experienced the highest variance of the three methods
which follows a hypothesis found in previous literature concerning the reasoning behind
feedlot and meatpacking firms moving from cash marketing or procurement to other
forms of marketing or procurement in today's fed cattle market. In addition, marketing
method 3 exhibited the lowest overall variance in transaction prices throughout the
marketing period. This finding is also in accordance with hypotheses that are found in
previous captive supply studies which imply that cattle feeding firms are able to further
reduce price variability risk by utilizing alternative marketing methods. It is also
apparent that marketing method 3 had the lowest variance of the three methods
considered by this study (Table 7). This finding is also helpful in determining possible
benefits to cattle feeding firms by utilizing alternative marketing methods.
Descriptive statistics were also computed to evaluate marketing method price
differences during the experimental periods of this study (Table 7). During non-
agreement periods, the mean price difference between methods land 2 was $0. 1lIcwt.
which can be interpreted as a small difference when compared to the price difference
between methods 1 and 2 during the agreement periods. Descriptive statistics
computed during the agreement periods also indicate that method 3 has a relatively
small price difference when compared to method 2. However, the mean price
difference between methods 1 and 3 indicates that method 3 had a lower mean price by
$0.69/cwt. during the agreement periods. Descriptive statistics between the agreement
and non-agreement periods of this study additionally indicate that the amount of method
2 transactions increased significantly from 2.53 % to 5.27% of the total number of
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transactions (i. e., 2,770 pens of finished cattle) during the agreement periods. This
suggests that marketing strategies were adjusted during the agreement periods in
response to the reduction of the supply of fed cattle that were available to the market.
Traditional Price Discovery Variables
The lagged boxed beef price (BBPt_1) has been found in previous research to be
significantly related to fed cattle transaction prices (Ward et al. 1996b). In this study,
the coefficient for BBPt_1 was found to be significant and positive in its relationship to
simulated fed cattle transaction prices in each of the three price level models (A, B, and
C). Specifically, fed cattle transaction prices were found to be positively impacted by
$O.38/cwt., $O.37/cwt., and $O.38/cwt. in models A, B, and C, respectively (Table 5).
These findings are consistent with relevant economic theory concerning derived demand
and are parallel to findings in previous research (Schroeder et a1.; Ward et a1. 1996b;
Ward 1992). Lagged live cattle futures market prices (LCFMPl _1) have also been found
in previous research to have significant positive impacts on fed cattle transaction prices
(Schroeder et al.; Ward 1981, 1982). Lagged live cattle futures market prices in this
study were also found to be positive and signiflcant. Fed cattle transaction prices were
found to be positively impacted by $0.20/cwt., $O.21/cwt., and $O.20/cwt. in models
A, B, and C, respectively (Table 5).
The relationships between the two cattle supply related variables used in this
study and fed cattle transaction prices are consistent with one another and with
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economic theory about how changes in the quantity supplied impacts prices within a
given market. The total supply of cattle in the market window or the number of cattle
available for purchase within a given week is known as the number of cattle on the
show list. This type of information is not publicly reported in the real-world market.
However, private organizations often attempt to collect show list data from the
members of those organizations (Ward et al. 1996b). The total number of pens of
cattle (100 hd./pen) on the show list for the previous week (TSLt-l) has been found in a
previous studies to have a negative and significant relationship with fed cattle
transaction prices (Ward et al. 1996b; Bacon, Trapp, and Koontz). Here, the
coefficient for TSLt_1 is also negative and significant in its relationship to fed cattle
transaction prices in each of the three price level models considered by this study (A,
B, and C). SPecifically, simulated fed cattle transaction prices are found to be
negatively impacted by $O.06/cwt. in models A, B, and C, (Table 5). The number of
cattle marketed by feedlots or slaughtered by meatpackers has been considered in two
previous studies. Schroeder et a1. found that the number of cattle marketed or
slaughtered significantly affects fed cattle transaction prices. However, Ward et al.
1996b did not find that the total number of cattle marketed in each simulated week
significantly impacted fed cattle transaction prices. In the FCMS setting, this number
is reported at the end of each week. As a result, the subjects are allowed to use the
total number of marketings from the previous week (TMt_l ) to formulate and arrive at
bid or ask prices for pens of finished cattle during the current week or trading period.
In this study, TMt_1 is found to have a negative and significant relationship to fed cattle
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transaction prices which is similar to the impact of TSLt-1• The coefficient in models
A, B, and C indicates that simulated fed cattle transaction prices decrease by
$0.76/cwt. with a one pen increase in the number of pens marketed for the previous
week (Table 5).
Ward et al. 1996b notes that a specific type of firm behavior is commonly
observed in the FCMS setting which is related to the manner in which meatpacking
firms an.d feedlot firms share available profits. The authors suggest that feedlot firms
are more often willing to be satisfied with a targeted profit margin that can be realized
by feeding and marketing finished cattle. The authors also suggest that meatpacking
firms more often attempt to gain the profits available to the market within a given time
period that are produced by purchasing finished cattle and selling the beef produced by
those cattle. As a result, when there are known profits to be shared in the fed cattle
market, meatpacking firms commonly attempt to capture the largest portion of the
amount to be negotiated. Much like in the real world, the subjects of the FCMS are
able to calculate the meatpacker and feedlot break-even price for 1150 lb. cattle from
week to week. The difference in the largest meatpacking firm's break-even price for
1150 lb. cattle and the feedlot firms' break-even price for 1150 lb. cattle is a proxy in
this study for the amount of profits or losses to be shared in a particular week or the
bargaining range. This amount will be referred to as the potential profit/loss for each
week (PPLJ. Previous research results have indicated that there is a negative and
significant relationship between PPLt and fed cattle transaction prices (Ward 1996b;
Ward 1981). Results found in this study (models A, B, and C) are consistent with
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previous findings in that a $l/cwt. increase in the potential profit/loss for each week is
associated with a $0. 13/cwt. decrease in fed cattle transaction prices.
Differences in managerial and negotiation skills have been found to exist
between individuals within the firms that participate in most markets. These
differences become collective for each firm as the individuals work together to
accomplish a common set of goals. Previous research has indicated that these
collective differences result in different types of market behavior and performance
which is often linked to the price differences among competing firms (Ward et al.
1996b; Carlton and Perloff). Previous research findings using the FCMS suggest that
significant price differences do indeed occur between the simulated meatpacking and
feedlot firms (Ward et al. 1996b). In this study, several of the simulated feedlot firms
(DFDLT) - DFDLTg) received significantly higher prices for the cattle marketed than
other feedlot firms. Accordingly, three of the simulated meatpacking firms (DPKR) -
DPKR4) received lower prices for the cattle that were purchased than the other
meatpacking firm. These results are consistent with previous findings that consider
price differences among firms (Jones et al.; Schroeder et al.; Ward 1982, 1992,
1996b). Significant feedlot price differences found here range from $O.68/cwt. to
$O.25/cwt. higher than the mean price received by Feedlot #1 in models A, B, and C.
Significant price differences among the meatpacking firms range from $0.47/cwt. to
$O.28/cwt. lower that the mean price paid for Meatpacker #1. These results are not
consistent with economies of size theory due to the fact that the smallest meatpacker
(#1) paid the highest price on average. Economies of size studies typically suggest that
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the largest meatpacking firm can pay the highest price given that there is adequate
inter-firm competition within the market (Ward 1993). Similar results were found by
Ward et al. 1996b where the authors suggested that these results may be due to
differences in managerial skills of the individuals operating the simulated firms.
Significant transaction price differences were found in relation to cattle quality
characteristics. Ward et al. 1996b found that simulated fed cattle weights representing
constant quality characteristics significantly affected fed cattle transaction prices.
These findings are parallel to previous research considering cattle quality characteristics
(Jones et al.; Ward 1981, 1982, 1992; Schroeder et al.). In this study, results from
models A, B, and C indicate that heavier weight classes (DWT4 and DWTs) are more
severely discounted by meatpackers than lighter weight classes compared to the optimal
weight class (DWT3). Mean break-even prices for each weight class realized by each
firm indicate that the 1150 lb. weight class provides simulated firms with the largest
amount of profits to be shared (Figure 1). These results parallel hypothesized break-
even price relationships for each simulated firm in the FCMS (Koontz et al 1994a). An
optimal weight class is considered in this study to be a weight class of cattle that allows
individual meatpacking and feedlot firms to share the greatest amount of profits or
minimize losses (Figure 1). The quality characteristics of each weight group are
described in Table 3. Significant price differences for heavy weight classes (D'WT4 or
DWTs) range from $0.40/cwt. (model B) to $O.32/cwt. (model C) lower than the
optimal weight class (DWT3). Results from models D, E, and F indicate that prices are
more variable for lighter and heavier weight classes than for the optimal weight class.
153
Descriptive statistics computed for each weight group reinforce model results by
indicating a general mean price level decrease as simulated firms moved from
marketing the lightest weight class to the heaviest weight class (Table 8 and Figure 2).
Marketing Method Variables
Specific types of captive supplies have been found in previous research to have
a negative relationship with fed cattle transaction prices (Schroeder et al.; Barkley and
Schroeder; Ward et al. 1996a). This study examines two types of captive supplies,
cash forward contracting and exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. This study
determines the price differences between two captive supply pricing arrangements or
marketing methods and cash market prices. Results from model A suggest that
significant price differences did not occur between cash market prices (marketing
method 1) and cash forward contracts (marketing method 2). Previous research results
concerning the price difference between these two methods have been mixed (Ward et
al. 1996a and Schroeder et al.). However, model A results do suggest there is a
negative and significant price difference between the exclusive marketing/procurement
marketing method (marketing method 3) and method I (DMETH3). Specifically, the
mean price for method 3 (DMETH3) was $0.73/cwt. lower on average than the mean
price realized by the firms that utilized marketing method I (DMETH1). In addition to
different mean prices, the method 3 coefficient (DMETH3) for model D suggests that
prices were significantly less variable $O.54/cwt. on average than the price variance for
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-marketing method 1 (DME11l1). The method 2 coefficient (DMETH2) in model D
indicates that method 2 had a significantly lower price variance by SO.63/cwt. lower
than the price variance of method 1 (DME11l t). Price differences between method 1,
method 2, and method 3 are presented in Figure 3.
This study also considers the price differences between marketing methods 1, 2,
and 3 that are realized by individual meatpacking and feedlot firms. Descriptive
statistics for the methods considered by each firm are presented in Table 9 and price
differences realized by each firm are presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6. Results from
model B indicate that Feedlot #4 and Feedlot #8 received significantly different prices
for method 2 transactions (DFINT42 and DFINT82) by SO.811cwt. and S0.49/cwt. lower
than method 1 prices, respectively. Results from model B also indicate that Feedlot #1
received significantly higher prices for method 2 transactions (DFINT1 2) by S0.44/cwt.
higher than method 1. The participating firms of the exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements in this study include Feedlot #2, Feedlot #5, and Meatpacker #4. Results
from model B indicate that Feedlot #2 and Feedlot #5 received significantly different
prices for method 3 transactions than for method 1 transactions. Specifically, results
indicate that Feedlot #2 and Feedlot #5 received prices for method 3 transactions
(DFlNI23 and DFINT53) that were $0.45/cwt. and $O.63/cwt. lower than method 1
prices, respectively. Results from model C indicate that Meatpacker #2 and
Meatpacker #4 received significantly different prices for method 2 transactions
(DPlNI22 and DPINT42) by $O.59/cwt. and $O.30/cwt. lower than method 1 prices,
respectively. In addition to lower method 2 prices, Meatpacker #4 was found to
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receive significantly lower prices for method 3 transactions. Specifically, results
indicate that Meatpacker #4 received prices for method 3 transactions (DPINT~) that
were $0. 66/cwt. lower than those received for method I transactions.
This study also extends beyond previous captive supply studies by evaluating
price variance differences for three marketing methods that are realized by individual
firms of the FCMS (Table 9). Results from model E indicate that price variability
differences were not realized by a majority of the simulated cattle feeding firms while
utilizing either marketing method 2 or marketing method 3. Specifically, Feedlot #5
was the only cattle feeding firm with a significantly different price variance for method
2 transactions (DFINT53) by $5.I5/cwt. higher than the price variance for method 1
transactions. An unexpectedly high variance difference between method I and method
2 could possibly be a result of the fact that Feedlot #5 used a small amount of forward
contracting in its marketing strategy relative to the number of forward contracts used by
the other cattle feeding firms. In contrast, results from model F indicate that
significant price variance differences between marketing methods 1 and 2 were realized
by meatpacking firms. Specifically, model F results indicate that meatpacking firms
#1, #3, and #4 realized significantly higher price variances for method 2 transactions
(DPINT1 2 , DPINT32 , and DPINT42) by $1.23/cwt., $0.82/cwt., and $5.38/cwt.
higher, respectively than the price variances realized for marketing method I
transactions.
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Summary, Implications, and Conclusions
This study focused on cash, forward contracting, and exclusive
marketing/procurement pricing arrangements which are recognized as alternative
marketing methods used by cattle feeding and meatpacking firms in fed cattle markets.
Each of the three methods were observed within an experimental simulation setting.
These methods have evolved to become common components of the marketing and
procurement strategies used by large meatpacking and cattle feeding firms in the
current fed cattle market. As a result of structural changes in the fed cattle market over
the past decade, large firms limit the amount of price discovery data that are available
to the public. These data are imperative to economic research that attempts to
adequately answer industry and market questions about price differences between
alternative marketing methods in the fed cattle market. The Fed Cattle Market
Simulator (FCMS) was developed to provide a realistic market framework and
institutional structure which allows market participants to complete decision making
processes in an experimental simulation setting (Ward et al. 1996b). This setting was
used to evaluate the price level and variability differences between cash tiansactions,
forward contracting, and exclusive marketing/procurement agreements. By allowing
each of the firms within the simulated market to utilize each marketing method, many
real-world data limitations are overcome.
Data for this study were provided by university junior and senior level
agricultural economics and animal science students who were participants of the FCMS
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during the Spring 1995 semester at Oklahoma State University. Transaction price level
and variability models were employed to determine the manner in which fed cattle
transaction prices differ between three different marketing methods. Over 75 weeks of
trading were evaluated which provided 2,770 independent transactions throughout the
entire experimental trading period.
Several economic variables were found to be generally consistent with a prior
FCMS study (Ward et al. 1996b) and other research projects dealing with fed cattle
transaction prices (Jones et al.; Schroeder et al.; Ward 1981, 1982, 1992). These
variables include boxed beef prices from the previous week, live cattle futures market
prices from the previous week, the potential profit/loss within each week, total
marketings/slaughter from the previous week, the number of cattle on the show list
from the previous week, the individual feedlot firms, and the individual meatpacking
firms. Results indicate a significant positive relationship exists between fed cattle
transaction prices and both lagged boxed beef prices and lagged live cattle futures
market prices. The number of head on the total show list and the number of cattle
marketed each week were consistent with economic theory in that they had significant
negative impacts on fed cattle transaction prices as supply variables. The amount of
potential profit/loss to be shared by the meatpacking firms and feedlot firms was found
to have a significant and negative effect on fed cattle transaction prices. This is parallel
to findings in a previous study that relates the inverse relationship of the bargaining
range to the cost-plus strategy that is believed to be followed by cattle feeding firms
(Ward 1996b).
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Differences in the prices paid by meatpacking firms and the prices received by
cattle feeding firms were found to be inconsistent with economies of size theory (Ward
1993) but consistent with previous research (Ward et al. 1996b). An explanation that is
commonly offered for this discrepancy is that managerial skills differ among
individuals within each firm. These differences are magnified as a group of individuals
cooperate to achieve similar goals which affects the way a feedlot or meatpacking firm
or team behaves within a market. Hence, behavioral differences can be attributed to
the manner in which prices were different between the simulated firms in this study.
The behavioral differences among firms are associated with different marketing or
procurement strategies utilized by each firm which yield price differences among firms
during a given market period.
The central question to be answered by this study is centered around price level
and variability differences between three specific and commonly used marketing
methods used by cattle feeding and meatpacking firms in the fed cattle market.
Research findings indicate that there are significant price level and variability
differences between cash, forward contracting, and exclusive marketing/procurement
agreements in the fed cattle market. Results indicate that meatpacking and cattle
feeding firms experience significantly lower price levels while utilizing the
marketing/procurement agreement marketing method relative to the cash marketing
method. Furthermore, results indicate significantly lower price variances are realized
by meatpacking and cattle feeding firms while utilizing the marketing/procurement
agreement marketing method relative to the cash marketing method. Significantly
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different price levels for forward contracting transactions were not found relative to
cash transactions in this study. This finding is not parallel to recent studies such as
Schroeder et al., Ward et aI. 1996a, and Ward et aI. 1996b. However, results suggest
that significantly lower price variances are realized for firms utilizing the forward
contracting marketing method relative to the cash transaction method. Implications
from these findings are: (I) cattle feeding firms are willing to accept lower prices and
subsequently lower profits in order ensure that cattle inventories are kept current and
(2) both cattle feeding and meatpacking firms potentially benefit from less variable
market prices for cash forward contract transactions.
Future research involving the use of experimental simulation is possible
provided that an adequate market and institutional structure is developed. The FCMS
is an example of an experimental simulation setting that allows its participants to learn
from the consequences of different types of decisions that are made in the fed cattle
price discovery process. This creates a realistic relationship between the simulated
cattle feeding and meatpacking firms which can be experimentally evaluated by the
application of experimental models of real-world occurrences in the fed cattle market.
The FCMS offers an opportunity to extend the topic considered in this study to
determining the effectiveness of the three marketing methods specified in reducing risk
and stabilizing profits for cattle feeding and meatpacking firms in the fed cattle market.
Beyond price difference issues within the fed cattle market, there are growing numbers
of fed cattle market questions that could be adequately addressed using experimental
simulation approaches within the FCMS.
160
References
Bacon, K.J., J.N. Trapp, and S.R. Koontz. 'Modeling and Forecasting Short-Run
Fed Cattle Slaughter." Proceedings of the NCR-134 Conference on Applied
Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management, M.L
Hayenga, ed. Ames, IA: Iowa State University. April 1992.
Barkley, A.P. and T.C. Schroeder. 'The Use and Impacts of Forward Contracts in
Fed Cattle Markets." Selected paper presented at the American Agricultural
Economics Association Annual Meetings, Manhattan, KS, August 1991.
Carlton, D.W. and J.M. PerIoff. Modern Industrial Organization. 2nd edition. New
York: Harper Collins College Publishers. 1994.
Eilrich, F., C.E. Ward, W.D. Purcell, and D.S. Peel. Forward Contracting vs.
Hedging Fed Cattle: Comparisons and Lender Attitudes. Blacksburg, VA:
Virginia Tech University, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing, February
1990a.
Farris, P. L Future Frontiers In: Agricultural Marketing Research. Ames: Iowa
State University Press. 1983.
Fausti, S.W. and D.M. Feuz. 'Production Uncertainty and Factor Price Disparity in
the Slaughter Cattle Market: Theory and Evidence." American Journal of
Agricultural Economics. 77(August 1995): 533-540.
Feuz, D.M., S.W. Fausti, and J.J. Wagner. ''Analysis of the Efficiency of Four
Marketing Methods for Slaughter Cattle. n Agribusiness: An International
Journal. 9(1993):5 453-463.
Feuz, n.M., S.W. Fausti, and J.J. Wagner. 'Risk and Market Participant Behavior in
the U.S. Slaughter-Cattle Market. n Journal ofAgricultural and Resource
Economics. 20(1995): 1 22-33.
Greene, W.H. LIMDEP, Version 6.0: User's Manual. Bellport, NY: Econometric
Software. 1991.
Hayenga, M.L. and D. O'Brien. 'Packer Competition, Forward Contracting Price
Impacts, and the Relevant Market for Fed Cattle. n Pricing and Coordination in
Consolidated Livestock Markets: Captive Supplies, Market Power, and IRS
Hedging Policy. Wayne D. Purcell, ed. Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech
University, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing. April 1992.
161
Jones R., T. Schroeder, J. Mintert, and F. Brazle. 'The Impacts of Quality on Cash
Cattle Prices." Southern Journal ofAgricultural Economics. 24(1992):2 149-
162.
Judge, G.G., RC. Hill, W.E. Griffiths, H. Liitkepohl, and T-C. Lee. Introduction to
the Theory and Practice of Econometrics. 2nd Edition. New York: John Wiley
&Sons, Inc. 1988.
Koontz, S.R, D.S. Peel, J.N. Trapp, and C.E. Ward. 'The Packer-Feeder Game:
A Commodity Market Simulator." Association ofBusiness Simulation and
Experimental Simulation. 21(l994a): 70-74.
Koontz, D.S. Peel, LN. Trapp, and C.E. Ward. 'Using a Market Simulator in
Marketing Extension Programs." Journal ofExtension. 32(1994b).
Koontz, S.R., D.S. Peel, J.N. Trapp, and C.E. Ward. 'Teaching Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness Education with an Experiential Learning Tool:
The 'Packer Feeder Game. '" National Association of College Teachers: An
Agricultural Journal. 32(1995a): 23-28.
Koontz, S.R, D.S. Peel, J.N. Trapp, and C.E. Ward. "Augmenting Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness Education with Experiential Learning." Review of
Agricultural Economics. 17(1995b):3 267-274.
Koontz, S.R., D.S. Peel, J.N. Trapp, and C.E. Ward. 'Employee Cross-Training
with a Market Simulator: An Agribusiness Application of Experiential
Learning." Agribusiness: An International Journal. 11(1995c):6 513-521.
Schroeder, T.C., R. Jones, J. Mintert, and A.P. Barkley. 'The Impacts of Forward
Contracting on Fed Cattle Transaction Prices." Review ofAgricultural
Economics. 15(1993):2 325-327.
Tomek, W. G. and K. L. Robinson. Agricultural Product Prices. 3rd Edition. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press. 1990.
Ward, C.E. 'Short-Period Pricing Models for Fed Cattle and Impacts of Wholesale
Carcass Beef and Live Cattle Futures Market Prices." Southern Journal of
Agricultural Economics. 13(1981): 125-132.
Ward, C.E. 'Relationship Between Fed Cattle Market Shares and Prices Paid by
Beefpackers in Localized Markets." Western Journal ofAgricultural
Economics. 7(1982): 79-86.
Ward, C.E. ''Inter-Firm Differences Between Fed Cattle Prices in the Southern
Plains." American Journal ofAgricultural Economics. 74(1992):2 480-485.
162
Ward, C.E. 'Comparative Analysis of Cattle Slaughtering and Fabricating Costs."
Agribusiness: An International JounUll. 9(1993):5 441-451.
Ward, C.B. and T.]. Bliss. Forward Contracting of Fed Cattle: Extent. Benefits.
Impacts, and Solutions. Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech University, Research
Institute on Livestock Pricing, Research Bulletin 4-89. November 1989.
Ward, C.B. and J.L. Hildebrand. "An Analysis of Price Differences for Slaughter
Lambs." Sheep Research JOUnUll. 9(1993):2 45-50.
Ward, C.E., S.R. Koontz, T.C. Schroeder, and A.P. Barkley. 'Short-Run Captive
Supply Relationships with Fed Cattle Transaction Prices." Proceedings of the
NCR-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting,
and Market Risk Management, B.W. Brorsen, edt Stillwater, Oklahoma:
Oklahoma State University. April 1996a.
Ward, C.E., S.R. Koontz, D.S. Peel, and J.N. Trapp. 'Pri.ce Discovery in an
Experimental Market for Fed Cattle.'" Review ofAgricultural Economics.
18(1996b):3 Forthcoming.
163
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF MEAN AND VARIANCE HYPOTHESIS TESTS CONSIDERED FOR EACH MARKETING
METHOD
Null Hypothesis (Ho) Alternative Hypothesis (Ha)
;-
0\
.j:>.
Value Considered
Mean Prices Between Methods
Method 1 vs. Method 2
Method 1 VS. Method 3
Mean Firm Prices Between Methods
Method I For Each Finn vs. Method 2
For Each Finn
Method 1 For Each Finn vs. Method 3
For Each Finn
Variance ofPrices Between Methods
Method 1 VS. Method 2
The mean price" of method 2
is equal to the mean price
of method 1 (Xl - X2 = 0) .
The mean price of method 3
is equal to the mean price
of method 1 (Xl - X3 = 0) .
The mean price of method 2
is equal to the mean price
of method 1 for each finn
(Xl -)(2 =0).
The mean price of method 3
is equal to the mean price
of method 1 for each finn
(Xl-)(3 = 0).
The price variance of method 2
is equal to the price variance
of method 1 (0',2 -0'2 2 = 0).
The mean price of method 2
is not equal to the mean price
of method 1 (Xl - X2 :;t; 0) .
The mean price of method 3
is not equal to the mean price
of method 1 (Xl - )(3 :;t; 0) .
The mean price of method 2
is not equal to the mean price
of method 1 for each finn
(Xl -)(2:;t; 0).
The mean price of method 3
is not equal to the mean price
of method I for each finn
(Xl - X3:;t; 0).
The price variance of method 2
is not equal to the price variance
method 1 (0'1 2 - 0'2 2 :;t; 0).
TABLE 1: CONTINUED
Value Considered Null Hypothesis CIL» Alternative HYPe>thesis (Ha)
0-
VI
Variance ojPrices Between Methods
Method 1 vs. Method 3
Variance ojFirm Prices Between Methods
Method 1 For Each Finn vs. Method 2
For Each Finn
Method 1 For Each Finn vs. Method 3
For Each Finn
a All prices are reported in $/cwt.
The price variance of method 3
is equal to the price variance
of method 1 (0"1 2 _0",2 = 0).
The price variance of method 2
is equal to the price variance
of method 1 for each finn
(0"1 2 _ 0"2 2 = 0).
The price variance of method 3
is equal to the price variance
of method 1 for each finn
(0'1 2 _0",2 = 0).
The price variance of method 2
is not equal to the price variance
method 1 (0"1 2 - 0",2 ;t:. 0).
The price variance of method 2
is not equal to the price variance
method 1 for each finn
(0"1 2 _ 0"1 2 ;t:. 0).
The price variance of method 2
is not equal to the price variance
method 1 for each finn
(0'.2 _ 0",2 ;/; 0).
TABLE 2: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR MODELS A, B, C, D, E, AND F
WITH EXPECTED SIGNS
Variables
Dependent Variables
TPFC;t
VTPFCC;t
Independent Variables
BBPt-1
LCFMPt-1
TSLt- l
DFDLlijt
Definition of Variable Expected Sign
ith transaction price for one pen of fed cattle N/A
($/cwt.) in week t
The natural log ofthe ith transaction price N/A
variance estimate ($/cwt.) calculated from
model A in week t
The natural log of the ith transaction price N/A
variance estimate ($/cwt.) calculated from
model B in week t
The natural log of the ith transaction price N/A
variance estimate ($/cwt.) calculated from
model C in week t
The boxed beef price ($/cwt.) for Choice Yield Positive
Grades 1-3 550-700 lb. carcasses, lagged one
week
The live cattle futures market closing price Positive
($/cwt.) for the nearby contract period, lagged
one week
The total number of pens marketed or Negative
slaughtered (lOOhd./pen), lagged one week
The total number of pens of cattle Negative
(lOOhd./pen) on the market ready show list,
lagged one week
The potential profit or loss in week t which is Negative
the largest meatpacker's break-even price
($/cwt.) for 1,150 lb. cattle less the mean
feedlot break-even price ($/cwt.) for 1,150 lb.
cattle
Binary dummy variables distinguishing each Pos./Neg.
individual feedlot firm, j=I-8, l=FDLTl
(Base), 2=FDLT2, 3=FDLT4, 4=FDLT4,
5=FDLT5, 6=FDLT6, 7=FDLT7, and
8=FDLT8
Binary dummy variables distinguishing each Pos.fNeg.
individual meatpacking firm, j=1-4, 1=PKR1
(Base), 2=PKR2, 3=PKR4, and 4=PKR4
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
Variables Definition ofVariable Expected Sign
Independent Variables
DWT;jt
DMETHijt
DFINTJ ijt
DFINT2ijt a
DFINT4ijt
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the 5 Pos./Neg.
different weight classes, j = 1-5, 1=1100 lbs.,
2=1125 lbs.. , 3=1150 lbs. (Base), 4=1175 Ibs. ,
and 5= 1200 lbs.
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
alternative marketing methods, j=1-3,
1=Marketing Method 1 (Base), 2=Marketing
Method 2, and 3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #1, j=I-3, l=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #2, j=1-3, I=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #3, j= 1-3, l=Marketing Method I
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #4, j=1-3, l=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables di.stinguishing the Pos.!Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #5, j=I-3, l=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
Variables Definition of Variable Expected Sign
Independent Variables
DFINT6ijt
DFINT7ijt
DFINT8ijt
DPINTlijt
DPINT2ijt
DPINT3ijt
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos.fNeg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #6, j=I-3, I=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #7, j=1-3, l=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos./Neg.
feedlot-marketing method interaction variables
for feedlot #8, j= 1-3, 1=Marketing Method 1
(Base), 2=Marketing Method 2, and
3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos.fNeg.
meatpacker-marketing method interaction
variables for meatpacker # I, j=1-3,
1=Marketing Method 1 (Base), 2=Marketing
Method 2, and 3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos.lNeg.
meatpacker-marketing method interaction
variables for meatpacker #2, j=I-3,
1=Marketing Method 1 (Base), 2=Marketing
Method 2, and 3=Marketing Method 3
Binary dummy variables distinguishing the Pos.lNeg.
meatpacker-marketing method interaction
variables for meatpacker #3, j=I-3,
1=Marketing Method 1(Base), 2=Marketing
Method 2, and 3=Marketing Method 3
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TABLE 2: CONTINUED
Variables Definition of Variable Expected Sign
Independent Variables
DPINT4ijt b Binary dummy variables distinguishing the
meatpacker-marketing method interaction
variables for meatpacker #4, j=1-3,
I=Marketing Method l(Base), 2=Marketing
Method 2, and 3=Marketing Method 3
Pos./Neg.
a Feedlot #2 and feedlot #5 were the only cattle feeding firms that utilized marketing
method 3. Hence, marketing method 3 variables will not be reported in subsequent
tables for all cattle feeding firms except feedlot #2 and feedlot #5.
b Meatpacker #4 was the only meatpacking firm that utilized marketing method 3. Hence,
marketing method 3 variables will not be reported in subsequent tables for all
meatpacking firms except meatpacker #4.
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TABLE 3: FCMS CATTLE QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS BY WEIGHT CLASS
Weight Carcass Dressing Choice Select Yield Grade 1-3 Yield Grade 4-5 Light Carcass Heavy Carcass
Class Weight Percentage %lPen %lPen %lPen %lPen %/Pen %lPen
DWT1 a 682 b 62,0 59 41 98,5 1.5 10 0
DWTz 703 62,5 63 37 97,0 3,0 5 0
DW73 724 63,0 67 33 95,5 4,5 0 0
DWT4 746 635 71 29 93,5 6,5 0 5
DWT5 768 64,0 75 25 91.0 9,0 0 10
a All variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 2,
b Carcass weights are reported in pounds,
TABLE 4: FCMS QUALITY RELATED PRICE DISCOUNTS
Price Discounts
Select Quality Grade or Below
Yield Grade (YG) 4's and 5's
Light Carcasses
Heavy Carcasses
($5,00/cwt.) * (Select %/Pen)
($10.00/cwt.) * (YG4-S %lPen)
($2.00/cwt.) * (Light Carcass %lPen)
($2,OO/cwt.) * (Heavy Carcass %lPen)
TABLE 5: ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE RELEVANT ECONOMIC
VARIABLES ON THE LEVEL OF FED CATILE TRANSACTION
PRICES
Transaction Price Level Models
Explanatory Variable Model A Model B Model C
Intercept 28.9780 *** a 29.0860 **'" 28.9210 ***
(4.701) b (5.043) (4.732)
BBPI_J 0.3757 *** 0.3721 *** 0.3753 ***
(14.834) (15.173) (14.949)
LCFMPt_1 0.1733 *** 0.1750 *** 0.1745 ***
(2.777) (2.999) (2.820)
1MI -J -0.0718 *** -0.0717 *** -0.0656 ***
(-3.325) (-3.547) (-3.064)
TSLt- l -00651 *** -0.0647 *** -0.0672 ***
(-6.380) (-6.780) (-6.650)
PPLt -0.1239 *** -0.1310 u. -0.1171 ***
(-3.004) (-3.400) (-2.864)
DFDLTl Base Base Base
DFDLT2 0.2617 *** 0.3160 *** 0.2504 ***
(3.058) (3.122) (3.004)
J)}1)LT3 0.4843 *** 0.6537 *** 0.4694 ***
(5.904) (7.018) (5.720)
DFDLT4 0.3545 *** 0.5762 *** 0.3678 .u
(4.441) (6.365) (4.691)
DFDL15 0.4016 *** 0.5356 *** 0.3497 ***
(4.794) (5.579) (4.333)
DFDLT6 0.2907 *** 0.4661 u'" 0.2858 *u
(3.581) (5.218) (3.605)
DFDLl:' 0.1447 * 0.37177 *** 0.1982 **
(1.730) (3.973) (2.415)
DFDLTs 0.0609 0.2400 *** 0.0764
(0.756) (2.706) (0.983)
DPKR l Base Base Base
DPKR..2 -0.3232 *** -0.4155 *** -0.2557 ***
(-5.300) (-6923) (-4.180)
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TABLE 5: CONTINUED
Transaction Price Level Models
Explanatory Variable Model A Model B Model C
DPKR3 -0.3695 *** -0.3037 *** -0.3327 ***
(-6.881) (-5.360) (-6.363)
DPKR4 -0.1037 * -0.1440 ** -0.1246 **
(-1.860) (-2.471) (-2.293)
DWT1 0.2615 0.3478 0.2092
(0.551) (0.680) (0.446)
DWT2 -0.1294 * -0.0711 -0.1734 **
(-1.810) (-0.986) (-2.436)
DWT3 Base Base Base
DWT4 -0.3578 *** -0.3563 *** -0.3205 ***
(-5.047) (-4.716) (-4.5] 7)
DWTs -0.3703 -0.3974 * -0.3586
(-1.630) (-1.676) (-1.586)
DMETH1 Base N/Ac N/Ad
DMETH2 -0.1328
(-1.583)
DMETH3 -0.7301 ***
(-8.775)
DFINTl 1 N/Ac Base
DFINTh 0.4378 ***
(2.840)
DFINT2 1 Base
DFINT22 -0.3267
(-0.834)
DFINT23 -0.4515 ***
(-4.217)
DFINT31 Base
DFINT32 0.1833
(0.956)
DFINT41 Base
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TABLE 5: CONTINUED
Explanatory Variable
DFINT42
DFINT51
DFINT52
DFINT53
DFINT6]
DFINT62
DFINT71
DFINT72
DFINT81
DFINT82
DPINTl j
DPINTh
DPINT2 1
DPINT22
DPINT31
DPINT32
DPINT4\
Transaction Price Level Models
Model A Model B Model C
-0.8104 ***
(-4.943)
Base
0.4586
(1.454)
-0.6281 ***
(-5.936)
Base
f
Base
-0.1910
(-0.665)
Base
-0.4868 ***
(-4.740)
Base
0.1014
(0.299)
Base
-0.5851 ***
(-4.439)
Base
-0.3932 *
(-2.273)
Base
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TABLE 5: CONTINUED
Transaction Price Level Models
Explanatory Variable
DPINT42
DPINT43
Model Statistics
Model A Model B Model C
-0.3000· ....
(-5.254)
-0.6622 .....
(-8.024)
N
Adjusted R2
F[21. 2748] g
F[28.2741J
F[24,2745J
2770
0.8171
584.5470 ***
2770
0.8318
484.2402· ....
2770
0.8166
509.3609 ***
• Significance levels are denoted as follows:
*** significant @ the 1% level of significance,
** significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and * significant @ the 10% level of significance.
b All figures presented in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics for each coefficient.
C Model B replaced marketing method variables with feedlot-marketing method
interaction variables.
d Model C replaced marketing method variables with meatpacker-marketing method
interaction variables.
e Feedlot-marketing method and meatpacker-marketing method variables were not
included in model A.
f Feedlot #6 did not utilize marketing method 2.
g The F-statistic in this study was used in a hypothesis test which is structured as
follows:
Null Hypothesis (Ho): The estimated coefficients in the respective
model (A, B, or C) are equal to zero.
Alternative Hypothesis (H.): At least one of the estimated coefficients in
the respective model (A, B, or C) is
significantly different from zero.
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TABLE 6: ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF THE RELEVANT ECONOMIC
VARIABLES ON THE VARIABILlY OF FED CATILE
TRANSACTION PRICES
Transaction Price Variability Models
Explanatory Variable Model D Model E Model F
Intercept 25.963' *** b 25.392 *** 27.809 ***
(3.666) c (7.106) (7.549)
BBPt-1 0.0143 0.0099 0.0068
(0.937) (0.667) (0.444)
LCFMPt- L -0.2832 *"'* -0.2651 *** -0.2978 ***
(-7.708) (-7.397) (-8.069)
1Mt-1 -0.4502 *** -0.0358 *** -0.0308 **
(-3.522) (-2.875) (-2.398)
TSLt- L -0.0094 -0.0153 ** -0.0123 '"
(-1.421) (-2.362) (-1.842)
PPLt -0.0974 **'" -0.0782 *** -0.0916 ***
(-3.811) (-3.138) (-3.560)
DFDLT1 Base Base Base
DFDLT2 -1.1410 *** -1.1628 *** -1.2867 ***
(-4.001) (-3.719) (-4.470)
DFDLT3 -2.0749 *** -2.0034 *** -2.1458 ***
(-7.541 ) (-7.100) (-7.706)
DFDL14 -1.7327 *** -1.6375 *** -1.8265 ***
(-6.535) (-5.835) (-6.813)
DFDLT5 -0.9105 **'" -1.1834 "'*'" -1.1487 **'"
(-3.236) (-3.756) (-3.997)
DFDLT6 -0.7818 *** -0.7095 *** -0.8338 ***
(-2.961) (-2.644) (-3.127)
DFDLT7 -0.9700 *** -0.8873 *** -0.9876 *"'*
(-3.686) (-3.201) (-3.731)
DFDLTg -1.7853 *** -1. 7079 *'" * -1.7869 '" "'*
(-6.756) (-6.232) (-6.699)
DPKR1 Base Base Base
DPKR2 0.2677 0.1807 0.4270 **
(1.309) (0.907) (1.977)
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TABLE 6: CONTINUED
Transaction Price Variability Models
Explanatory Variable Model D Model E Model F
DPKR3 0.1182 0.1257 0.1595
(0.599) (0.651) (0.786)
DPKR4 0.2248 0.0873 0.2694
(1.084) (0.432) (1.277)
DWT1 -0.1389 -0.4627 -0.1109
(-0.123) (-0.421) (-0.098)
DWT2 0.6281 "''''* 0.5886 ** 0.6825 ***
(2.617) (2.519) (2.829)
DWT3 Base Base Base
DWT4 1.3569 *"'''' 1.4859 *** 1.3989 *"''''
(6.337) (7.114) (6.516)
DWT5 2.2326 *** 2.2776 "'*'" 2.3245 ***
(4.894) (5.125) (5.099)
DMETH1 Base N/Ad N/Ae
DMETH2 -0.6288 "'*
(-2.433)
DMETH3 -0.5440 '"
(-1.838)
DFINTI] N/A[ Base
DFINT12 0.0867
(0.204)
DFINT2] Base
DFINT22 -0.2361
(-0.222)
DFINT23 -0.4556
(-1.211)
DFINT3] Base
DFINT32 -0.5556
(-0.551 )
DFINT41 Base
DFINT42 -0.1621
(-0.285)
176
TABLE 6: CONTINUED
Explanatory Variable
DFINT51
DFINT52
DFINT53
DFINT61
DFINT62
DFINT71
DFINT72
DFINT8]
DFINT82
DPINTl l
DPINTh
DPINT2 1
DPINT22
DPINT3 1
DPINT32
DPINT4 j
DPINT42
DPINT43
Transaction Price Variability Models
Model D Model E Model F
Base
5.1510*"'*
(7.786)
-0.1937
(-0.494)
Base
g
Base
0.5155
(0.803)
Base
-0.5091
(-0.690)
Base
1.2283 *
(1.866)
Base
0.1441
(0.396)
Base
0.8236 *
(1.796)
Base
5.3816 ***
(5.388)
-0.3167 *
(-1..658)
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TABLE 6: CONTINUED
Transaction Price Variability Models
Explanatory Variable
Model Statistics
Model D Model E Model F
N
Adjusted R2
F(2I, 2748] h
F[28,2741]
F[24,2745]
2770
0.0827
11.8036 ***
2770
0.1010
10.9965 ***
2770
0.0964
12.2024 ***
a All coefficient results are reported as the exponential value of the estimated
coefficient.
b Significance levels are denoted as follows:
*** significant @ the 1% level of significance,
** significant @ the 5% level of significance,
and * significant @ the 10% level of significance.
C All values presented in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics for each coefficient.
d Model E replaced marketing method variables with feedlot-marketing method
interaction variables.
C Model F replaced marketing method variables with meatpacker-marketing method
interaction variables.
f Feedlot-marketing method and meatpacker-marketing method variables were not
included in model D.
g Feedlot #6 did not utilize marketing method 2.
h The F-statistic in this study was used in a hypothesis test which is structured as
follows:
Null Hypothesis (He): The estimated coefficients in the respective
model (D, E, or F) are equal to zero.
Alternative Hypothesis (H.): At least one of the estimated coefficients in
the respective model (D, E, or F) is
significantly different from zero.
178
TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MARKETING METHODS 1,2, AND 3 DURING AGREEMENT AND
NON-AGREEMENT PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Percent of Total Marketings N
Entire Marketing Period
DMETH l a 80.73 3.36 69.00 86.67 81.41 2255
DMETH2 79.52 2.59 71.25 85.00 7.80 216
DMETH~ 78.92 2.11 77.10 88.45 10.79 299
Agreement Periods
DMETH1 81.42 1.94 76.25 86.67 25.74 713
DMETH2 80.41 1.72 77.50 85.00 5.27 146
~ DMETH3 78.92 2.11 77.10 88.45 10.79 299-..l
'D
Non-Agreement Periods
DMETH1 77.76 3.25 69.00 82.75 55.67 1542
DMETH2 77.65 3.06 71.25 80.50 2.53 70
DMETH3 N/Ab
a All variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 5.
b Marketing method 3 was only allowed during two 16-week experimental periods.
'1
TABLE 8: DESCRlPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH WEIGHT CLASS DURING AGREEMENT AND NON-
AGREEMENT PERIODS
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Agreement Periods
DWT1 a 81.50 1.78 78.50 83.25 9
DWT2 81.13 1.75 77.30 84.15 137
DWT3 81.04 1.99 76.25 88.45 939
DWT4 81.75 2.03 78.50 86.00 54
DWTs 82.53 2.87 80.00 86.67 19
Non-Agreement Periods
- DWT1 N/A bco
<=>
DWT2 78.74 2.63 71.00 82.75 103
DWT3 77.97 3.08 70.10 82.00 1167
DWT4 76.69 3.64 69.00 81.60 296
DWTs 77.07 3.96 72.00 82.15 46
a All variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 5.
b There were no 1100 lb. cattle marketed or purchased during the non-agreement periods.
TABLE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FIRM PRICES UNDER EACH ALTERNATIVE MARKETING METHOD
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Marketing Method 1
DFDLT) 3 78.38 3.57 70.00 86.00 270
DFDLT2 79.48 3.37 70.40 82.00 196
DFDLT3 79.54 3.35 71.75 86.67 31 ]
DFDLT4 79. ]9 3.24 69.80 85.35 292
DFDLTs 79.52 2.57 7] .00 81.90 195
DFDLT6 79.31 3.46 69.00 85.90 345
DFDLT7 79.05 3.44 69.00 85.50 306
DFDLTg 79.07 3.22 70.50 85.50 340
-00
- DPKR1 80.29 3.31 71.10 86.67 493
DPKR2 79.93 3.49 70.00 86.67 498
DPKR3 79.87 3.41 69.00 85.90 685
DPKR4 79.65 3.19 70.40 85.35 579
Marketing Method 2
DFDLT1 80.2] 2.02 72.80 85.00 79
DFDLT2 79.44 0.28 79.00 79.65 10
DFDLT3 81.14 1.89 78.75 8250 II
DFDLT4 80.13 2.01 78.00 83.10 38
DFDLTs 76.30 3.63 71.25 80.15 28
~
TABLE 9: CONTINUED
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N
Marketing Method 2
DFDLT6 N/Ab
DFDLT7 80.18 1.45 77.55 82.42 29
DFDLTg 78.38 2.35 72.00 80.00 21
DPKR 1 81. 11 1.97 77.50 85.00 29
DPKR2 79.13 2.40 71.25 82.50 115
DPKR3 80.35 1.71 78.00 83.10 60
DPKR4 75.22 3.66 72.00 80.15 12
00 Marketing Method 3
t-...>
DFDLT2 c 78.74 2.02 77.22 87.03 161
DFDLTs 79.13 2.19 77.10 88.45 138
DPKR4 78.92 2.11 77.10 88.45 299
a All variable definitions and their respective units of measure are presented in table 2.
b Feedlot #6 did not utilize marketing method 2.
c The simulated firms that utilized marketing method 3 are Feedlot #2, Feedlot #5, and Packer #4.
1
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FIGURE 1: A GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF MEAN BREAK-EVEN AND TRANSACTION .PRICES
BY WEIGHT CLASS
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1FIGURE 2: MEAN PRICES BY WEIGHT GROUP DURING AGREEMENT AND
NON-AGREEMENT PERIODS
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•There were no 1200 lb. cattle marketed during the agreement periods.
~FIGURE 3: MEAN PRICES BY MARKETING METHOD DURING DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTAL PERIODS
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1FIGURE 5: MEAN PRICES BY MARKETING METHODS 1 AND 2 FOR EACH MEATPACKING FIRM
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1FIGURE 6: MEAN PRICES BY MARKETING METHODS 1 AND 3 FOR FEEDLOT #2, FEEDLOT #5,
AND MEATPACKER#4
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